The Dragon-Kings’ Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ Surveillance Conundrum by Lubin, Asaf
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University 
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law 
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship 
Winter 2018 
The Dragon-Kings’ Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ 
Surveillance Conundrum 
Asaf Lubin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law of the Sea Commons 
 
17 
The Dragon-Kings’ Restraint: Proposing a 




The United States and China are at it again, as naval and aerial 
interceptions in and around the South China Sea become a matter of 
disturbing routine.  At the heart of the dispute stands the lingering 
question of whether customary international law as reflected in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)
authorizes third States to engage in surveillance and military 
maneuvers in coastal States’ Exclusive Economic Zones (“EEZ”)
without their consent.  The answer lies in interpreting Article 58(1) of 
UNCLOS.
This paper aims to respond to the calls put forward by States, 
scholars, and research institutes to promote a legal compromise 
between permissive and prohibitive interpretive approaches to 
UNCLOS Article 58(1).  The traditional interpretation of the Article, 
and the EEZ Surveillance conundrum more broadly, has thus far been 
reviewed by scholars solely through the lenses of the age-old debate 
between Hugo Grotius and John Selden over Mare Liberum and Mare 
Clausum.  In other words, existing scholarship treats the dispute as a
binary zero-sum game.
The model proposed in the Article recognizes the freedom of 
navigation premise as an analytical starting point, but nonetheless 
introduces, for reasons of maintaining minimum order, a set of 
restraints (“necessity,” “last resort,” and “proportionality”) to be 
internalized by third States in deciding whether to launch intelligence 
operations in another coastal State’s EEZ. To develop these standards,
the paper examines the limits of a State’s right to spy under 
international law and the effects that advancements of surveillance 
technology have had over our evolutionary interpretation of UNCLOS. 
The paper’s nuanced approach thus treats the EEZ surveillance 
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problem as a microcosm through which to examine meta-issues 
concerning the function intelligence plays in our public world order.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fifteenth century, if one were to speak of a naval intelligence 
operation, thoughts would probably have wandered to the Portuguese 
explorer Pêro da Covilhã.  Traveling in disguise as an Arab honey merchant, 
da Covilhã provided King John II and his courtly advisers detailed and vivid 
reports of the intricate international trade routes between India and Sub-
Saharan Africa.1 Moving to the eighteenth century, maritime intelligence 
collection remained intrinsically the same; examine, for instance, the tasks 
accomplished by Captain Caleb Brewster on board his Revenue Cutter 
“Active” during the American Revolutionary War. Brewster monitored the 
movement of enemy British Men-of-War off the coast of Long Island and 
relayed the information back to officials in New York.2 During World War
I, naval surveillance officers continued to be predominantly occupied by 
traditional reconnaissance and monitoring missions.3 John Held, Jr., an 
agent of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, offers a good example: Held 
served for fourteen months under the guise of an archeological researcher, 
while attempting to sketch potential hiding places for German submarines 
in Central America.4
1. For further discussion of the work of Pêro da Covilhã as a spy serving in the name of King 
John II, see PETER O. KOCH, TO THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: THE AGE OF THE EUROPEAN EXPLORERS 66–
70 (McFarland 2003) (“Pêro da Covilhã was well suited for such an important and perilous 
assignment . . . .  While in the King’s service he participated quite admirably in a number of covert 
operations for the Crown, most notably as a secret agent at the Court of Spain’s King Ferdinand and 
Queen Isabella.  King John also sent him on intelligence gathering missions to the distant cities of 
Tlemcen and Fez in North Africa where, as well as learning the customs of the Arab people, he also 
managed, thanks to a gifted ear for language, to master the Arabic tongue . . . .  King John II and his 
courtly advisers poured over the detailed reports supplied by Pêdro da Covilhã.  His rich description of 
the local markets and vivid details of an intricate international network of trade occurring in the part of 
the world further strengthened Portugal’s determination to find a route that would take them past the 
great barrier of Africa across the vast width of the Indian Ocean.”).
2. See WILLIAM H. THIESEN, WAR OF 1812: REVENUE CUTTER OPERATIONS AND THE CORE
COAST GUARD MISSIONS 13–14 (2012), http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=AD1024313
[https://perma.cc/Z44M-Z4VQ] (“With naval vessels cruising at sea and naval gunboats often stationed 
in port cities, revenue cutters became [efficient] maritime intelligence gathering tools.  They did their 
best to monitor enemy naval movements, locate British privateers, and provide news regarding 
American merchantmen.  Because of their speed and agility, the revenue cutters proved the most reliable 
source of this naval intelligence.  Revenue cutter captains gathered and shared this information with 
customs collectors, local officials, newspapers and military personnel . . . .  While the Active and 
General Greene proved the most notable intelligence gathering revenue cutters, the rest of the cutters 
also reported important military intelligence, such as numbers and positions of enemy ships, landing of 
troops, and provisioning of enemy vessels.”).
3. See generally CHRISTOPHER FORD & DAVID ROSENBERG, THE ADMIRALS’ ADVANTAGE: U.S.
NAVY OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR (2005).  It should be noted 
that World War I did introduce the potential of radio interception in advancing military goals.  The 
British naval commanders relied on such interceptions in tackling the new naval threat presented by
German submarines.  This later formed the basis for the expansion in usage of High-Frequency Direction 
Finding (“HF/DF”) during World War II.  Id.
4. WYMAN H. PACKARD, A CENTURY OF U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 41 (1996).
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It was truly World War II and to a greater extent the Cold War that 
were the crucible in which maritime signal intelligence gathering 
(“SIGINT”) and maritime electronic intelligence gathering (“ELINT”) first 
began to take shape.5 This era saw a flood of advancements in the field of 
applied sciences, including: radar, sonar, and laser technologies; electro-
optical, oceanographic, hydrographic, acoustic, geophysical, and geospatial 
sensing; satellite spot-beam and microwave relay traffic interception 
systems; airborne and ship-based maritime communication surveillance, 
and electronic warfare (“EW”) capabilities; and more recently, long-
endurance reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (“UAV”) and 
Unmanned Maritime Systems (“UMS”).  These technologies helped 
reconceptualize and revolutionize maritime intelligence collection in both 
peacetime and wartime.6 Operations that once involved a risk to a State’s 
diplomatic relations and to the lives of airmen and ground troops could now 
be performed in a covert manner and at a greater distance from both the 
target and the coastal State.
The ability to operate militarily from beyond the littoral and to collect 
new types and greater volumes of information introduced a series of ever-
more complex legal and policy considerations.7 Moreover, with the 
development of EW capabilities, States could now jam or even paralyze a 
coastal State’s communication and defense systems, thus shifting away 
from “passive” intelligence gathering operations to “active” perpetration of 
electronic attacks from outside territorial bounds.8 As was noted by one 
5. Judson Knight, Ships Designed for Intelligence Collection, ESPIONAGE INFORMATION:
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ESPIONAGE, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY, http://www.faqs.org/espionage/Se-
Sp/Ships-Designed-for-Intelligence-Collection.html [https://perma.cc/STS5-66CJ] (“The concept of 
using ships as modern intelligence-gathering platforms evolved, along with larger modern ideas of 
intelligence operations in general, from World War II.  The Cold War saw the deployment, on both the 
Soviet and American sides, of ships tasked with gathering communications and electronic intelligence.  
Some of these were disguised as fishing vessels, a practice common on the Soviet side, while the United 
States favored vessels operating under the guise of research craft.”).
6. For a complete review of technological advances in the field of maritime intelligence 
gathering, see Desmond Ball, Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs: The Implications of New 
Technology, 28 MARINE POL’Y 67 (2004).  See also H. Lawrence Clark, Technology Development for 
Ocean Sciences at NSF, in 50 YEARS OF OCEAN DISCOVERY: NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 1950-
2000 128, 128–32 (2000).
7. See generally Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation, Surveillance and Security: Legal Issues 
Surrounding the Collection of Intelligence from Beyond the Littoral, 24 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 93 (2005).
8. Moritaka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key 
Terms, 29 MARINE POL’Y 123, 126 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (noting that “the [United Nations] Charter 
and subsequent legal developments in the United Nations have not taken into account highly advanced 
technologies, in particular the latest electronic warfare (EW) capabilities which are becoming 
increasingly more intensive and intrusive.  A crucial question is whether some of the EW-related 
activities conducted in or above the EEZ should be considered to be inconsistent with the Charter and 
thus the peaceful purposes clauses of the 1982 UNCLOS.  Particularly relevant in this context are active
signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities conducted from aircraft and ships, some of which are 
deliberately provocative, and intended to generate programmed responses.  Other SIGINT activities 
intercept naval radar and emitters, thus enabling the location, identification, and tracking of surface ships
as well as the planning and preparation of electronic or missile attacks against them.  These activities 
appear to involve far greater interference with the communication and defense systems of the targeted 
coastal State than any traditional passive intelligence gathering activities conducted from outside 
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commentator, these new technological advances in maritime espionage, 
while offering a great promise to navies, serve as a destabilizing force, 
further threatening to unravel the delicate fabric of international maritime 
security:
The recent developments with respect to SIGINT, [electronic-warfare] 
and cyber-warfare capabilities and activities in maritime areas are likely, 
on balance, to be destabilising in crisis situations and detrimental to 
regional security in general.  SIGINT, ELINT and network-related 
collection activities are not only increasing, they are also likely to become 
more intrusive–and more important for the infringed party to take 
defensive measures against.9
Further clouding this worrisome picture of stability-thwarting 
technology is the “vague and ambiguous” legal framework governing 
surveillance activities within and above the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(“EEZ”).10 The regime of the EEZ is one of the greatest novelties of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).11
Nonetheless this juridical innovation brought with it a “battle for control” 
between the rights of the coastal State and the maritime use claims of 
foreign States.  As noted by Galdorisi and Kaufman:
Like the transformation of a river’s fresh flowing water into that of the 
salty sea, the transition from territorial seas to high seas is not abrupt.  
There is no clear and bright line, but rather a region where the sea absorbs 
and dilutes the silty residue of sovereign ground, gradually replacing its 
fresh, muddy, provincial brown with salt and clear blue water freedom.  
Currents carrying elements of coastal State sovereignty and jurisdiction 
converge and combine in the EEZ with those containing freedoms of 
navigation and associated uses in favor of all States, swirling and twisting 
national territory.”).
9. Ball, supra note 6, at 78.  See also Xue Guifang (Julia), Surveys and Research Activities in the 
EEZ: Issues and Prospects, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.–CHINA DIALOGUE ON 
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 89, 94 (Peter Dutton ed., 2010) (in 
the context of the parallel issue of Marine Scientific Research (“MSR”), Guifang similarly argues that 
“[a]long with the advancement of technology in recent decades, tremendous capabilities have been 
employed to collect large amounts of marine data using various instruments deployed from ships, such 
as balloons, profiling floats, moored and drifting buoys, remotely operated vehicles, and offshore or 
near-offshore fixed platforms.  The data for MSR can also be collected by satellite or by equipment on 
civilian or military aircraft or ships.  More and more research projects use remote-sensing technologies 
on platforms located outside the jurisdictional waters of coastal states.  The coastal state can find 
attempting to distinguish among hydrographic surveys, military surveys, and MSR in its EEZ very 
frustrating.  This state of affairs may eventually lead to a collapse of the present MSR regime in the 
EEZ.”).
10. George V. Galdorisi & Alan Kaufman, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: 
Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 253, 255 (2002); see also
Boleslaw Adam Boczek, Peacetime Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Third 
Countries, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 445, 458 (“While it is true that the institution of the EEZ has 
become an established fact and rule of customary international law, codified in the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 1982, the precise scope of the rights of the coastal and other states in the zone still 
remains to be defined in the free interplay of the competing interests of the coastal Third World countries 
on the one hand and the maritime nations supporting the traditional freedoms of the sea on the other.  
The uncertainty is nowhere so striking as in the area of the military uses of the EEZ.”).
11. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
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in sometimes competing directions.  The EEZ is, in a juridical sense, 
brackish, murky and treacherous water; a 188 mile-wide band of 
turbulent ocean separating the territorial sea from the high seas in which 
competing desires for control and use meet, mix and merge.  The EEZ is 
a zone of tension between coastal State control and maritime State use of 
the sea.  The battle for control defines the exclusive economic zone.12
This “battle for control” is perhaps most heightened in the context of 
military activities and intelligence collection operations, conducted within 
and above a coastal State’s EEZ.  The delegations to the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS III”) preferred “not 
to make any express statement about the problem of military uses in the 
exclusive economic zone,” arguing against the appropriateness of the 
conference as a forum for such negotiations.13 The final wording of 
UNCLOS Part V thus intentionally left open the volatile question of 
peacetime naval maneuvers and reconnaissance missions within and above 
the zone.14
This has since resulted in a series of contentious security claims based 
12. Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 257.
13. R.W.G. de Muralt, The Military Aspects of the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, 32 NILR 78, 
94 (1985); see also FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUÑA, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: REGIME AND 
LEGAL NATURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (1989) (stressing that one of the most troubling 
elements of the work of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea was the military use of the EEZ, 
arguing that: “Although the subject was discussed only occasionally and was never the object of formal 
negotiation, it was implicitly present behind many of the provisions on the exclusive economic zone that 
we have examined and in the interpretations that have been made since then.  Although some countries 
promoted the formal discussion of the subject, it was never accepted by the maritime powers, since in 
their opinion this issue did not correspond to the Law of the Sea Conference but to special forums in the 
field of department and the like . . . .  Whatever the answer may be, the maritime powers would hardly 
accept restrictions on their wartime military activities”); Robert Beckman & Tara Davenport, The EEZ 
Regime: Reflections After 30 Years, in LOSI CONFERENCE PAPERS: SECURING THE OCEAN FOR THE 
NEXT GENERATION 2, 24–25 (Harry N. Scheiber & Moon Sang Kwon, eds., 2012) 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Beckman-Davenport-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZP6-YYZJ] 
(attributing the vagueness of wording of UNCLOS Article 58 to the compromises reached during 
negotiations and noting that: “Military activities or uses in the EEZ were not explicitly mentioned during 
official negotiations, due to the belief of many States, including the US, that this would quickly derail 
any efforts for a convention. However, there was no doubt that preserving the traditional high seas 
freedom of military operations and activities in the EEZ was a high priority for the US . . . .  However, 
it is also fair to say that some coastal States such as Brazil persistently objected to this interpretation.”).
14. Francesco Francioni, Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of the Sea,
18 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 203, 213–14 (“The Convention alone provides no easy answer to the question 
of how establishment of the EEZ may affect peaceful military activities by foreign navies.  Rather, the 
Convention’s provisions on the EEZ leave a large margin of ambiguity and uncertainty as to the nature, 
status, and scope of coastal states’ rights within the zone.  Such ambiguity is understandable in a legal 
instrument whose relevant provisions were drafted under the strain of opposing tendencies . . . .  Apart 
from spelling out freedom of navigation in the EEZ and in the upper adjacent air space, article 87 does 
not clarify which foreign naval military activities are lawful in the EEZ.  Controversial activities include 
military maneuvers; weapons tests; the gathering of strategic information by intelligence ships or 
airplanes; launching, landing or taking on board aircraft or any other military equipment or device.”); 
see also Alexander Skaridov, Military Activity in the EEZ, in FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND 
THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 249, 262 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009) 
(“‘Uncertainty’ is probably the best word to describe the status of ‘military activity’ in the modern Law 
of the Sea.  The 1982 UNCLOS is not an appropriate instrument to resolve controversial issues, 
particularly, in regard to the EEZs and continental shelf claims.  Because of this the most critical items 
like combat exercises, intelligence gathering, and hydrographic surveys very much depend on the coastal 
State’s interests and regional ambitions.”); Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 269–73.
22 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 57
on conflicting interpretations of the provisions of UNCLOS,15 as well as 
numerous maritime protests, confrontations, and incidents involving fishing 
and oil exploration vessels, coast guard and naval ships, and military 
aircraft.16 Perhaps most well-known of these were the string of Sino-
American maritime incidents and confrontations in the South China Sea,17
including in particular the 2001 EP-3 and 2009 USNS Impeccable crises.18
Similar incidents, of lower gravity but equal volatility, persist to this day, a 
recent example being the intercept of a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft over 
the East China Sea by Chinese fighter jets in July 2017.19
This fractious dispute has brought some commentators to argue that 
the controversy over intelligence collection within and above the EEZ will 
not be resolved inside the realm of the law.20 Others have claimed that 
15. See, e.g., JAMES KRASKA & RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW 277–
78 (2013) (“Moving from West to East, virtually from Al Barsah, Iraq, next to Iran, to Vladivostok, 
Russia, just 30 miles from North Korea, there is a 7000-mile unbroken line of States that purport to limit 
military activities in the EEZ that stretches from the Persian Gulf all the way to East Asia . . . .
Worldwide there are 18 nations that claim a security interest in the Exclusive Economic Zone, typically 
by purporting to restrict foreign-flagged military activities.  Among these nations, two are in South 
America (Brazil and Uruguay), two in Africa (Kenya and Cape Verde), one in the Middle East (Iran), 
and 13 are in Asia [Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
China and North Korea, Maldives, Mauritius and Indonesia . . . .  In addition, the seven nations that 
illegally claim territorial seas in excess of 12 nm include: Benin (200nm), Republic of Congo (200nm) 
Ecuador (200nm), Liberia (200nm), Peru (200nm), Somalia (200nm) and Togo (30nm) . . . .  And there 
are five nations that claim security jurisdiction in their 24 nm contiguous zone.”); see also de Muralt, 
supra note 13, at 94–95.
16. See Mark J. Valencia, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in Exclusive Economic 
Zones: Consensus and Disagreement, Summary of the Bali Dialogue, 4–10 (June 27–28, 2002), 
www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/BaliDialogue.pdf [https://perma.cc/52NB-ZH38] 
[hereinafter Summary of the Bali Dialogue]; Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and 
Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 CHIN. J.
INT’L L. 9, 12–18 (2010).
17. The dispute is most apparent in the Asia-Pacific region, in part for the fact that quite a number 
of overlapping 200nm EEZ claims persist there.  Moreover, within the Asia-Pacific region there are a 
number of significant actors which “purport to regulate military activities in the EEZ in one form or 
another,” namely: India, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia, PRC, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Mauritius, and 
North Korea.  See Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Military Activities In and Over the Exclusive Economic Zone,
in FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 235, 237 (Myron 
H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009).
18. Andrew S. Erickson & Emily de La Bruyere, China’s RIMPAC Maritime-Surveillance Gambit,
THE NATIONAL INTEREST (July 29, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-
rimpac-maritime-surveillance-gambit-10970 [https://perma.cc/2ZCP-Z77Z ].  Other incidents include 
China’s interference with the USNS Bowditch in 2001, the USNS Victorious in 2009, and, more recently, 
China’s dispatch of an Auxiliary General Intelligence vessel off the coast of Hawaii during its first 
appearance in the Rim of the Pacific Maritime exercises of July 2014.  Id. For a summary of these 
incidents, see Ankit Panda, East China Sea: 2 Chinese Fighters Conduct ‘Unsafe’ Intercept of US EP-
3 Surveillance Aircraft, THE DIPLOMAT (July 25, 2017), http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/east-china-sea-
2-chinese-fighters-conduct-unsafe-intercept-of-us-ep-3-surveillance-aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/T2JP-
CW8D ]; see also infra notes 152–155 and accompanying text (describing more incidents of China’s 
interference); see generally RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42784, MARITIME 
TERRITORIAL AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES INVOLVING CHINA: ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS, 4–7 (2014).
19. See Panda, supra note 18.  Two Chinese Air Force fighters conducted an intercept of a U.S. 
Navy EP-3 Aries surveillance aircraft over the East China Sea.  The incident occurred eighty nautical-
miles off China’s mainland.  According to one report the two Chinese jets “came within 300 feet of the 
EP-3” and forced them to change course in mid-air.  Id.
20. Alan M. Wachman, Playing by or Playing with the Rules of UNCLOS, in MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.–CHINA DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
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setting any legal restrictions, in an age of technological advancement, would 
prove “ineffective and irrelevant.”21 Nonetheless, States, scholars, and 
research institutes remain firm in their call for a legal compromise between 
currently existing permissive and prohibitive interpretive approaches to the 
UNCLOS debate.22
This paper seeks to respond to these calls for such compromise, by 
developing a new conciliatory legal model for intelligence gathering within 
and above the EEZ.  In developing this model, the author rejects previous 
scholarly attempts to resolve the dispute by relying solely on traditional 
treaty interpretation approaches.  Instead, the author examines the EEZ 
surveillance conundrum through a consideration of the specific function 
intelligence serves in our public world order.  The paper is thus divided into 
three Sections.
The first Section presents the conflicting legal positions underlying the 
debate between currently existing prohibitive and permissive interpretive 
approaches to UNCLOS Article 58(1).23 At the heart of this debate lies the 
MARITIME COMMONS 107, 108–11 (Peter Dutton ed., 2010) (noting that “[a] resolution of the EEZ issue 
is unlikely to emerge from a discussion of law, because the law is not really the problem.  Sino-U.S. 
relations are strained because of the ways in which the strategic aims of Beijing and Washington collide 
and chafe against one another during a period of rapid transition of stature and perceived power . . . .
For both American and Chinese strategists and statesmen, then, the controversy about what is allowable 
under UNCLOS is not a simple question of how best to interpret the convention but is the outgrowth of 
geostrategic competition under conditions of a security dilemma.  Both defend their positions as matters 
of principle . . . .  Fundamentally, each side deploys legal reasoning to justify actions it feels compelled 
to take for the enhancement of its security.  As neither side is prepared to debase itself by relinquishing 
its pretense of equanimity—divulging how menaced the other makes it feel—each behaves as an 
aggrieved party, deprived of rights that it claims are plainly stated in UNCLOS, rights that it believes it 
could yet enjoy if only the other side would recognize the proper interpretation of the law.  For both 
Americans and Chinese writing on this matter, fault rests squarely on the shoulders of the other nation.  
Neither is prepared to acknowledge or ‘own’ the means by which it exacerbates underlying suspicions 
by actions it takes.”).
21. See Summary of the Bali Dialogue, supra note 16, at 18 (“Technology has dramatically 
changed the art of warfare and intelligence gathering.  There have been vast improvements in the range 
and accuracy of both weaponry and intelligence collection so that, in the age of Aegis, satellites, aircraft 
carriers, missiles, and over-the-horizon weaponry and intelligence collection, extending restrictions in 
the EEZ is largely ineffective and irrelevant.”).
22. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 7, at 104–05 (“The gathering of intelligence from the sea and air 
raises difficult questions for the international community.  The Law of the Sea Convention largely avoids 
issues surrounding military activities.  This is both an indication of the tension surrounding these issues, 
and avoidance itself has created difficulties . . . .  The international community should endeavour to 
clarify the rights and duties of states in the context of navigation and intelligence gathering, to avoid 
incidents such as that in the South China Sea occurring.”); Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 300 
(“When all is said and done the salient fact remains that the EEZ is an important international area and 
that vast oceanic areas, that were once the high seas, are now included in the EEZ . . . .  [T]he 
international community is left to make peaceful resolution of the contentious issues regarding military 
activities in the EEZ a matter of priority.”); Summary of the Bali Dialogue, supra note 16, at 20–21 
(“States have fundamental disagreement over whether military activities in the EEZ should have any 
limits . . . .  The views on how to address these disagreements are disparate and wide-ranging . . . .
[S]ome believe that the situation is sufficiently urgent, complicated, and rife with misunderstanding that 
concerned states should be pro-active . . . .  Clearly there is a need for greater communication and 
transparency within the region.  Further dialogue and research is needed on the meaning of relevant 
Convention provisions.”).
23. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 58(1) (“In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether 
coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred 
to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and 
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long-established clash between the customary law of the sea principle of 
“freedom of navigation”24 and the equally pertinent U.N. Charter principles 
of “sovereign equality,” “territorial integrity,” and “non-intervention.”25
The Section will examine the permissivist argument raised in favor of 
allowing intelligence collection in and above the EEZ of coastal States, its 
strongest proponent being the United States; followed by a review of the 
prohibitionist counter-arguments raised in favor of restricting such 
intelligence collection activities, done without the prior consent of the 
coastal States, the most vocal advocate of this approach being the People’s 
Republic of China (“PRC”).  As we shall see, both of these one-dimensional 
legal maxims seem more concerned with discrediting each other rather than 
illuminating political and legal solutions, thus setting the stage for an 
alternative broader analysis of the law and policy-considerations 
surrounding the issue.
The second Section attempts to offer such an analysis.  This article
turns to the question: To what extent, and under what circumstances, should 
surveillance in the EEZ qualify as “internationally lawful uses of the 
seas,”26 or as serving “peaceful purposes”?27 Stepping outside the wording 
of UNCLOS, the Section offers different lenses through which to 
understand the EEZ intelligence conundrum.  The Section begins by 
examining the function intelligence performs in our public world order.  The 
Section further reaffirms the right of a State to spy (the jus ad 
explorationem) as a derivative sovereign right under international law.  
Nonetheless, taking into account the modern expansion of States’ 
surveillance capabilities as well as the proliferation of threats to maritime 
security, the Section tries to determine when the right to spy might be 
abused. The Section thus relies on the evolutionary interpretation of treaties 
and on the doctrine of abuse of rights with the aim of further elucidating 
policy considerations in this field.
Drawing on this review, the third and final Section presents a new legal 
model for determining the legitimacy of certain intelligence gathering 
activities within and above the zone.  While accepting “freedom of 
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions 
of this Convention.”).
24. Id. art. 87(1)(a).
25. U.N. Charter art. 2(1), (4), (7); see also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States (Oct. 24, 
1970); G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs 
of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, art. 1, (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 
36/103, annex, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs 
of States, ¶ 2(II)(f) (Dec. 9, 1981).
26. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 58(1).
27. Id. art. 88 (“The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.”); see also id. art. 58(2) 
(“Articles 88 and 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone 
in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.”).
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navigation” as an analytical premise, the Section, for reasons of ensuring 
minimum order, introduces a set of restraints (“necessity,” “last resort,” and 
“proportionality”) on third States’ unilateral covert intelligence gathering 
operations within the zone.  The Section then concludes by looking at a 
number of recent real-life controversies, attempting to square them with the 
above-mentioned criteria.
II. IN THE JAWS OF THE DRAGON-KINGS
The mythology of ancient China tells the story of four great Dragon-
Kings: Ao Kuang, Ao Chin, Ao Jun, and Ao Shun.  Each of the Dragon-
Kings controlled a different portion of the seas under the direction of the 
-Kings 
ruled over all aquatic life and were responsible for the distribution of the 
rains and waters by manipulating the clouds.  They lived in gorgeous crystal 
and pearl palaces in the depths of the sea, where they were attended by 
crayfish, lobsters, and crabs as guards, and by scaly fish as servants.28 The 
Dragon-Kings were depicted in traditional Chinese folklore as ghastly 
beasts:
Fish are boiled by the blast of its breath, and roasted by the fiery 
exhalations of its body.  When it rises to the surface the whole ocean 
surges, waterspouts foam, and typhoons rage.  When it flies, wingless, 
through the air, the winds howl, torrents of rain descend, houses are 
unroofed, the firmament is filled with a din, and whatever lies along its 
route is swept away with a roar in the hurricane created by the speed of 
its passage.29
Missile submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, 
cruisers, and destroyers are the modern-day equivalent of the Dragon-
Kings.  If this analogy holds true, this would seem to make the United States 
and the PRC—in command of the two most powerful navies in the 
world30—our modern-day Jade Emperors.  This is why much of the debate 
concerning the lawfulness of military maneuvers and surveillance 
operations within and above a coastal State EEZ has circled around the 
conflicting views presented by these two maritime superpowers.
Since it first originated as a unilateral proclamation by the Presidents 
of Chile and Peru in 1947,31 the concept of the EEZ has been embroiled in 
a legal dispute.  Within this newly developed sui generis belt of waters,32
questions arose as to the extent of the sovereign territorial rights of coastal 
28. CAROL ROSE, GIANTS, MONSTERS, AND DRAGONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOLKLORE,
LEGEND AND MYTH 21 (2001).
29. EDWARD T.C. WERNER, MYTHS AND LEGENDS OF CHINA 210 (1922).
30. See ALEX TROST & VADIM KRAVETSKY, 100 OF THE MOST POWERFUL NAVIES IN THE WORLD
(2013).
31. Counter-memorial of the Government of Chile, Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), 2014 I.C.J. 
Pleadings 3, at 50–62 (Mar. 9, 2010).
32. Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 273, 275.
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States and how these would be properly balanced off against the maritime 
States’ navigational rights and freedoms.33 The recognition by the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) of the concept of the EEZ as forming 
“part of modern international law,”34 and the later codification of this 
regime within the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, did not diffuse this 
inherent tension.
Coastal States enjoy, within their EEZ, full sovereign rights “for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the 
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities 
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone.”35 Coastal States 
also have limited jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of 
artificial islands, installations, and structures; marine scientific research 
(“MSR”); and the protection and preservation of the marine environment, 
within the zone.36 This list, however, is not exhaustive, as UNCLOS Article
56(1)(c) confers upon the coastal State other rights as provided for 
elsewhere in the Convention.37
In this context, specific attention has been given to the security claims 
of the coastal States.  During negotiations, efforts were made by China and 
the members of the G-77 “to broaden coastal State rights and jurisdiction in 
the EEZ” as to include security interests.38 As noted previously, the 
majority of the delegates to UNCLOS III were reluctant to address this 
matter expressly.39 The final wording of UNCLOS, therefore, did not 
directly grant specific authorities to the coastal State to prevent or otherwise 
control military activities by third States within and above its EEZ;40
however, neither did it reject such authority.  Instead, it recognized in 
Article 58(1) that all States, including landlocked States, shall enjoy within 
the EEZ the high seas rights and freedoms “of navigation and overflight and 
of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally 
33. For a review of the historical origins and developments of the concept of the EEZ and its 
influence on the question of its legal nature, see VICUÑA, supra note 13, at 3–16.
34. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 100 (Feb. 24).
35. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 56(1)(a).  In particular, the Convention notes the rights of the 
coastal State in the field of energy production “from the water, currents and winds.”  Id.
36. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 56(1)(b).
37. Id. art. 56(1)(c).  For a broader discussion on the problem of residual rights of coastal States, 
see VICUÑA, supra note 13, at 35–39.
38. Pedrozo, supra note 16, at 10; see also 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 558 (Nandan, Rosenne and Grandy eds., 1993).
39. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text; infra note 86 and accompanying text.
40. NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 46–47 (2011).  Klein 
acknowledges that the “[c]oastal states are not . . . granted any specific authority over military activities 
in the EEZ . . . [nor is there] power vested in the coastal state to respond to acts that prejudice its peace, 
good order, or security as is the case with the territorial sea”.  Id.  Nonetheless, Klein concludes by 
saying that “[t]he right of a coastal state to prevent or control military activities that occur within its 
EEZ remains controversial.”  Id.
2018] The Dragon-Kings’ Restraint 27
lawful uses of the sea.”41
Stating the law in this fashion did not resolve the dispute but simply 
turned the problem on its head.  Instead of looking at the rights of coastal 
States to prevent military and surveillance exercises in their EEZs, the 
language of UNCLOS now called for an examination of whether the flag 
States are allowed to conduct such activities as a derivative of their high 
seas freedoms.  This in turn has led to the development of two contradictory 
interpretative approaches to UNCLOS Article 58(1): a permissive approach 
and a prohibitive approach, most strongly advocated by the United States 
and the PRC, respectively.  As explained by one commentator: “For China 
and other coastal countries, what is not authorized in the Convention is not 
permitted; for the US and other maritime powers, what is not explicitly 
prohibited in the Convention is permitted.”42
Should the Dragon-Kings be allowed to stir up the seas, or should they 
be shackled to territorial cages?  This Section will summarize and evaluate 
the persuasiveness of the two conflicting answers to this question, as 
advanced by our modern-day Jade Emperors.  In supporting their reading of 
Article 58(1), permissivist and prohibitionist scholars have both relied 
heavily on traditional treaty interpretation models as codified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.43 These scholars have thus put forward, 
in support of their arguments, an analysis of the ordinary meaning of 
UNCLOS Part V articles, the object and purpose of the Convention, its 
travaux preparatoires, and the prior and subsequent practice of States 
coupled with additional policy rationales.44 Reviewing the literature, it 
becomes evident that both groups of scholars hold the other’s arguments in 
low esteem, and assign something approaching divine authority to their 
positions.45 By directly contrasting the permissive and prohibitive 
41. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 58(1) (emphasis added).  Article 88 further reaffirmed that the 
EEZ, much like the high seas, shall be reserved for “peaceful purposes.”  Id. art. 88 (emphasis added).
42. Ji Guoxing, The Legality of the “Impeccable Incident,” in 5 CHINA SEC. No. 2, 19, 22 (2009), 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/117001/Issue14full.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT5C-2KPF].  This sentiment 
echoes the now well-recognized Lotus doctrine in international law.  See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 
Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 9, at 19 (Sept. 7) (“[International law leaves states] in this respect a 
wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other 
cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”).  I 
address later in the paper the limits of relying on Lotus in resolving this dispute.  See infra Section III.
43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
44. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Odom, The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What Really 
Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should be 
Concerned, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 411, 437 (2010) (“With both nations staking their respective legal 
claim about this matter on the record . . . it is critical to consider the development of this area of 
international law in several stages.  First, this requires considering the history predating the UNCLOS.  
Then, it involves considering the negotiations between nations of the world which resulted in the final 
text of UNCLOS.  Next, it warrants looking at the actual terminology of UNCLOS itself.  Finally, it 
means examining the state practice of the overwhelming majority of nations after UNCLOS was 
concluded.  Ultimately, considering these critical facets of the applicable law will highlight the law in 
its actual state—vice as what one nation might wish it to be.”) (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Wachman, supra note 20, at 111 (“[I]n Beijing as in Washington, the focus is on 
what UNCLOS permits and why it is therefore obvious that the other side is in violation of clearly stated 
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interpretative approaches, this Section will show, however, that no clear 
international legal rule reigns supreme.  Indeed, following traditional treaty 
interpretation approaches to the EEZ surveillance legal conundrum only 
gets one so far, as the matter was intentionally left unresolved by the drafters 
of UNCLOS.  This will in turn set the stage for a minimum-order based 
alternative inspection of the EEZ surveillance issue, in Section II of this 
paper, which draws guidance from a deeper review of both the impact of 
new technologies on the law of the EEZ and the function intelligence 
performs in public life.
A.  The Permissive Approach: Letting the Dragon-Kings Stir Up the Seas
Shortly after the signing of UNCLOS, President Reagan proclaimed a 
U.S. 200-mile EEZ,46 which was accompanied by a statement on United 
States’ ocean policies.  The statement began by stressing the leadership role 
taken by the United States in “developing customary and conventional law 
of the sea” with the objective of establishing “a legal order that will, among 
other things, facilitate peaceful, international uses of the oceans.”47  For the 
United States, the matter of what such “peaceful international uses” might 
entail, in the context of the EEZ, was a rather simple one.
It was in fact the American representative, Ambassador Elliot 
Richardson, who introduced the language of “internationally lawful uses”
into Article 58(1).  The intention behind the inclusion of this phrase was to 
secure that the traditional high seas freedoms would remain “qualitatively 
and quantitatively the same” when applied within the zone.48 The view of 
precepts . . . .  [E]fforts by American and Chinese commentators to convince each other of views they 
proffer as unassailable have, thus far, failed.  Indeed, Americans and Chinese advocates frequently “talk 
past” one another.  Where the EEZ is concerned, statesmen, scholars, soldiers, and other commentators 
advance assertions that flow from premises that are simply not shared by nationals in the other state.”).
46. Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22, 23 (1983) (concluding that “[w]ithout prejudice to the 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the United States, the Exclusive Economic Zone remains an area 
beyond the territory and territorial sea of the United States in which all States enjoy the high seas 
freedoms of navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea”).
47. Presidential Statement on United States Ocean Policies, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383 
(Mar. 10, 1983) (emphasis added).  The statement then proceeded to announce that:
[T]he United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms 
on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in 
the [UNCLOS].  The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other 
states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of international community in navigation 
and overflight and other related high seas uses.
Id.
48. Elliot L. Richardson, Power, Mobility, and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 902, 916
(explaining further the meaning of “qualitative” and “quantitative” in this context: “they must be 
qualitatively the same in the sense that the nature and extent of the right is the same as the traditional 
high-seas freedoms; they must be quantitatively the same in the sense that the included uses of the sea 
must embrace a range no less complete–and allow for future uses no less inclusive–than traditional high-
seas freedoms”); see also Beckman & Davenport, supra note 13, at 25 (“To the US, the intention behind 
‘other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms such as those associated with the 
operation of ships,’ was to preserve traditional high seas freedoms such as the freedom to conduct a 
large range of military activities.”); Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data 
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the American delegates was that “military operations, exercises and other 
related activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses 
of the sea.”49 Therefore, so long as Article 58(1) protected such 
internationally lawful uses, “the right to conduct such activities will 
continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone.”50 This 
would inevitably include intelligence collection and other reconnaissance 
operations.  Modern day challenges to this contention, however, have 
brought permissivist scholars to raise four interpretive claims in defense of 
their position, briefly summarized below.
1. Permissivist Reading of Ordinary Meaning, Object, and Purpose
Permissive interpreters of the EEZ surveillance question note the fact 
that “the very nature of the EEZ, as indicated by its name, is that coastal 
states have been granted powers in this ocean area in order to protect and 
utilize the natural resources of their marine environment for economic 
reasons, rather than for traditionally conceived security interests.”51 Or as 
another commentator neatly phrased it: “It’s the economic zone, stupid.”52
These scholars endorse a functional conceptualization of the EEZ 
according to which the only cases of interference which the coastal State 
may potentially engage with (and presumably respond to) are those relating 
to its economic utilization of the zone.53 Examples of such interference 
Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA 
DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 23, 34 (Peter Dutton 
ed., 2010).
49. Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Plenary 
Meetings, Vol. 17, 244, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and Add.1-2 (Dec. 10, 1982).
50. Id.
51. KLEIN, supra note 40, at 46; see also Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 262 (“A clear 
theme had emerged.  These coastal States did not purport to seek sovereignty for its own sake, for the 
sake of pure territorial expansion, or for defense of the nation from military threat.  They rationalized 
their need for sovereignty as needed to protect and utilize the natural resources of their marine 
environment.  There interests were economic and environmental in nature. It followed, therefore, that 
uses associated with the exercise of freedom of navigation, to the extent that they did not intrude upon 
or harm these interests, were not at issue.  The control they claimed to seek was of a limited nature; so, 
the exclusion required could be limited to that necessary to pre-serve and protect the stated 
environmental and economic interests.”).
52. Odom, supra note 44, at 439 (emphasis added); see also Andrew S. Williams, Aerial 
Reconnaissance by Military Aircraft in the Exclusive Economic Zone, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE 
EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS
49, 50 (Peter Dutton ed., 2010). (“[A]t a minimum, that foreign military activity in the EEZ may not 
unduly interfere with the rights and interests of the coastal state in the marine environment and its natural 
resources.  Examples of military activities that would run afoul of this provision include weapons 
exercises that cause significant damage to a valuable resource being exploited by the coastal state, that 
deny access to traditional fishing grounds, or that create hazards to commercial fishing.”).
53. Zhiguo Gao, China and the Law of the Sea, in FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 
1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 265, 292 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009) (“It seems that 
there is at least some agreement on the conduct of military and intelligence gathering activities, that is, 
the exercise of freedom of navigation and overflight in and above EEZs should not interfere with or 
endanger the rights of the coastal State to protect and manage its own resources and its environment, 
and should not be for the purpose of marine scientific research.  And the exercise of such freedoms of 
navigation and overflight should not interfere with the rights of the coastal States with regard to their 
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include illegal fishing, severe environmental pollution, or unauthorized 
ocean mapping for scientific purposes, when conducted by third States.54
Anything beyond these restrictive bounds would fall outside the coastal 
State’s jurisdiction and authority.  For permissivists, the EEZ was created 
to achieve the UNCLOS preamble goals of “just and equitable international 
economic order” and the “economic and social advancement of all people 
of the world.”55 Attempting to assign to the EEZ other preamble goals 
would be dishonest and ineffectual.
Furthermore, permissivists’ holistic understanding of the zone is 
rooted in UNCLOS Article 87, which guarantees high seas freedoms.56 In 
this context, for permissivist scholars, coastal States lack authority or 
enforcement power over military activities, including surveillance and 
reconnaissance activities, as any other interpretation would infringe on 
these core protected freedoms.57 Similarly, any interpretative reading of 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures in the EEZ.”); Francioni, supra 
note 14, at 225 (“[W]henever military activities come into conflict with peaceful uses, the former must 
yield to the latter.  This is true not only with respect to the EEZ, where economic activities fall within 
the sovereignty of the coastal state, but also with respect to the area beyond national jurisdiction, where 
eventual exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals may well give rise to a problem of competition 
between military activities and economic use of ocean space.  A standard of preference for economic 
use is not only logically justified in view of the necessary localization of resource-related activities, but 
above all permits at least some legal effectiveness to be given to the ‘peaceful use’ clauses and to the 
ordinary meaning of their language.  This is in accordance with article 31(l) of the Vienna Convention 
and with the general principle of effectiveness, or effet utile.”).
54. VICUÑA, supra note 13, at 114; KLEIN, supra note 40, at 46.  Note however that this too serves 
an opening for debate.  In this context China has argued that U.S. Navy sonar use in its EEZ potentially 
could harm marine mammals and disrupt fish stocks and should thus be restricted.  Pedrozo claims that 
“there is no evidence that the Navy’s sonar use, while applying [various mitigation and] protective 
measures, impacts either marine mammals or fish.”  Pedrozo, supra note 16, at 24.  Pedrozo further 
refers to a 2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision which rejected similar contentions to those of China, 
raised by environmental groups, noting that:
One of the most important ways the Navy prepare for war is through integrated training 
exercises at sea.  These exercises include training in the use of modern sonar to detect and 
track enemy submarines, something the Navy has done for the past 40 years . . . President 
Theodore Roosevelt explained that ‘the only way in which a navy can ever be made efficient 
is by practice at sea, under all conditions which would have to be met if war existed’
Id.; see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 11, 33 (2008) (“We do not discount the 
importance of plaintiff’s ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals.  Those 
interests, however, are plainly outweighed by the Navy’s need to conduct realistic training exercises to 
ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines”) (citation omitted).
55. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at pmbl.
56. Id. art. 87(1) (“The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.  Freedom 
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of 
international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of 
navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part 
VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, 
subject to Part VI; (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom 
of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.”).
57. See, e.g., Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacific 
Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (July 15, 2009), reprinted in
O’ROURKE, supra note 18, at 38–39 (“[W]e reject any nation’s attempt to place limits on the exercise 
of high seas freedoms within an exclusive economic zones [sic] (EEZ).  Customary international law, 
as reflected in articles 58 and 87 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
guarantees to all nations the right to exercise within the EEZ, high seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight, as well as the traditional uses of the ocean related to those freedoms.  It has been the position 
2018] The Dragon-Kings’ Restraint 31
EEZ-related UNCLOS articles will acquire its legitimacy only if it applies 
this functional understanding.  Two specific issues should be discussed at 
greater length in light of the permissivists’ functional approach: “marine 
scientific research” and the principle of “due regard.”
i.  “Marine Scientific Research” within the EEZ
UNCLOS Article 56(1)(b)(ii) grants the coastal State jurisdiction over 
all MSR activities taking place within the EEZ.  Article 246 further clarifies 
that the coastal States, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, have the right “to 
regulate, authorize and conduct” MSR in the zone.58 Although third States 
may conduct MSR operations with the consent of the coastal State,59 that 
consent should generally be granted, so long as “normal circumstances” 
persist.60 While UNCLOS is moot as to the definition of an MSR,61
commentators have noted that the Convention does reference “survey 
activities” and “hydrographic surveys” seemingly in isolation from 
“scientific research.”62 Permissivist scholars have thus sought to narrow 
the meaning of MSR, relying on this fact and on their functional 
interpretation of the EEZ discussed above. In accordance with their 
understanding, MSR would only cover “resource related” activities which 
could effectively trigger the coastal States’ recognized economic 
interests,63 thus excluding from the definition of MSR such activities as: 
of the United States since 1982 when the Convention was established, that the navigational rights and 
freedoms applicable within the EEZ are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those rights and 
freedoms applicable on the high seas”).
58. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 246(1); cf. id. art. 245 (granting the coastal State within its 
territorial waters “exclusive right to regulate, authorize and conduct” MSR (emphasis added)).
59. Id. art. 246(2).
60. Id. art. 246(3). In this context Article 246(4) makes clear that: “for the purposes of applying 
[Article 246(3)], normal circumstances may exist in spite of the absence of diplomatic relations between 
the coastal State and the researching State.”  Id. art. 246(4).
61. A definition of MSR is not provided by UNCLOS “because there was a consensus at the 
conference that the substantive provisions of the convention clearly establish the meaning intended, 
making a definition of the term unnecessary.”  Wu Jilu, The Concept of Marine Scientific Research, in 
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 65, 69–70 (Peter Dutton ed., 2010).  Nonetheless, two draft definitions 
were submitted during UNCLOS III, the first by The Working Group on Marine Scientific Research and 
Transfer of Technology, which defined MSR as: “any study and related experimental work, excluding 
industrial exploration and other activities aimed at the direct exploitation of marine resources, designed 
to increase mankind’s scientific knowledge of the marine environment and conducted for peaceful 
purposes”; the second by Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Nigeria, which defined MSR for the 
purposes of the Convention as: “any study and related experimental work conducted in the marine 
environment designed to increase mankind’s knowledge thereof.”  Id. at 70.
62. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 19(2) (“Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be 
prejudicial . . . in any of the following activities . . . (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities”) 
(emphasis added); id. art. 21(1) (“The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations . . . in respect of all 
or any of the following . . . (g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys”) (emphasis added); 
id. art. 40 (“During transit passage, foreign ships, including marine scientific research and hydrographic 
survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey activities without the prior authorization of the 
States bordering straits.”) (emphasis added).
63. Moritaka Hayashi, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Foreign Coastal 
States, in THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AT 30: SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND NEW 
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hydrographic surveys,64 military surveys and surveillance,65 collection of 
meteorological data, routine ocean observations, and activities related to 
submerged wrecks or objects of an archeological and historical nature.66
Moreover, despite the fact that the EEZ regime grants the coastal State 
jurisdiction over the protection of the marine environment,67 U.S. Navy 
officials have argued that environmental monitoring, such as the assessment 
of marine pollution, would also fall outside the limited scope of MSR, 
basing this interpretive move on a broad reading of third States’ obligations 
under UNCLOS Article 194.68 Captain Pedrozo (U.S. Navy JAG, retired) 
further distinguishes between MSR and other marine data collection 
activities, clarifying that:
[T]he primary difference between MSR and military marine data 
collection and hydrographic surveys is how the data are used once they 
are collected.  Although the means of data collection may be the same as 
or similar to that used in MSR, and though it may be difficult for the 
coastal state to differentiate between MSR and other data-collection 
activities, the information obtained during military marine data collection 
or a hydrographic survey is intended for use by the military or to promote 
safety of navigation, respectively . . . .  While some of these data may 
have economic utility, even though they were not collected for that 
AGENDAS 121, 123 (David Freestone ed., 2013).  In this context, MSR would be generally defined as 
“those activities undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters to expand scientific knowledge of the marine 
environment and its processes.”  J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES 
TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 426 (2d ed., 1996).  For Pedrozo, this would include “physical 
oceanography, marine chemistry and biology, scientific ocean drilling and coring, geological and 
geophysical research, and other activities with scientific purposes. The data collected are normally 
shared freely with the public and the scientific community.”  Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 28.
64. KLEIN, supra note 40, at 221–22 (defining Hydrographic Surveys as information relevant “for 
the making of navigational charts and the safety of navigation,” including “determination of one or more 
of several classes of data in coastal or relatively shallow areas—depth of water, configuration and nature 
of the natural bottom, directions and force of currents, heights and times of tides and water stages, and 
hazards of navigation—for the production of nautical charts and similar products to support safety of 
navigation”).
65. Id. at 222 (defining Military Surveys as “activities undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters 
involving marine data collection (whether or not classified) for military purposes, and can include 
oceanographic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biological and acoustic data.  Equipment used 
can include fathometers, swath bottom mappers, side scan sonars, bottom grab and coring systems, 
current meters and profilers”).
66. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 27.  In accordance with The Commander’s Handbook on the Law 
of Naval Operations: “[a]lthough coastal nation consent must be obtained in order to conduct marine 
scientific research in its exclusive economic zone, the coastal nation cannot regulate hydrographic 
surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor can it require notification of such 
activities.”  U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations, 2–9 (2007), http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/NWP_1-14M_ 
Commanders_Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/79DB-ACQS].
67. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 56(1)(b)(iii).
68. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 27; UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 194(1), (2) (“States shall take, 
individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose 
the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they shall 
endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection.”); id. art. 194(2) (“States shall take all 
measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to 
cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from 
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they 
exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.”).
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purpose, military marine data collected by the U.S. armed forces in 
foreign EEZs are used exclusively for military purposes and to promote 
safety of navigation and are not shared with the general public.69
Indeed, even the G-77 countries recognized the difference between 
military marine data collection and MSR, at least during UNCLOS III 
negotiations.  The developing countries proposed to include “military 
activity” as its own category in the set of criteria enumerated in Article 
246(5) (which lists situations in which coastal States may, in their 
discretion, withhold consent to the conduct of an MSR).  This proposal was 
eventually rejected,70 further justifying the exclusion of military and 
hydrographic surveys from MSR’s definitional scope (and thus from the 
overall scope of a coastal State’s jurisdiction).
ii.  “Due Regard” obligations within the EEZ
Article 56(2) and Article 58(3) of UNCLOS set reciprocal obligations 
on both the coastal State and flag State to have “due regard” to the rights 
and duties of their counterpart State in the performance of their duties under 
the Convention.71 If the EEZ regime had brought with it a “battle for 
control,”72 these provisions were developed with the aim of striking a 
“balance of interests and rights” between conflicting tides within the zone.73
Nonetheless, the Convention provides very little as to the actual meaning of 
“due regard,” so much so that there seems to be “no agreed specific criterion 
for States to follow in determining whether their activities have fulfilled the 
‘due regard’ requirement.”74
The United States has taken the position that “due regard” should be 
equated with “reasonable regard,” as defined under the High Seas 
Convention,75 noting that there is “no substantive difference between the 
two terms.”76 The United States has contended in the context of the High 
Seas that:
69. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 28–29.
70. Muralt, supra note 13, at 97.
71. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 56(2) (“In exercising its rights and performing its duties under 
this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.”); id. 
art. 58(3) (“In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.”).
72. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
73. Hayashi, supra note 8, at 132.
74. Id.
75. Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (“The 
high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its 
sovereignty.  Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and 
by the other rules of international law . . . .  These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the 
general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the 
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”).
76. Beckman & Davenport, supra note 13, at 14 (“UNCLOS adopted the formulation of ‘due 
regard’ in relation to competing uses in the high seas, the Area and the EEZ instead of ‘reasonable 
regard’ referred to in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, but the differences are purely semantic.”).
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The “reasonable regard/due regard” standard requires any using State to 
be cognizant of the interests of others in using a high seas area, to balance 
those interests with its own, and to refrain from activities that 
unreasonably interfere with the exercise of other States’ high seas 
freedoms in light of that balancing of interests.77
To define what would constitute an “unreasonable interference,” 
permissivists rely on the ICJ’s Corfu Channel Case, which they understand 
as setting “a strong precedent that maritime navigational freedoms cannot 
be interfered with, even to protect security interests.”78 Furthermore, one 
commentator has suggested that: “the fact that a particular coastal State may 
have a low threshold of anxiety regarding ships and aircrafts off its coast 
cannot diminish the rights of the flag state.”79  In other words, for American 
scholars, the application of the “due regard” standard entails the exclusion 
of any of the PRC’s subjective concerns, or a consideration of China’s 
particular “eggshell skull” mentality as a former colony,80 when it comes to 
threats to its territorial integrity. Due regard becomes a technical, objective, 
and unyielding analysis of “reasonableness” directly linked to the actual 
rights and duties of both parties.
This position was also reflected in the American response to the 
interception of the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23).  The interception was 
executed by five PRC vessels on March 8, 2009 in the South China Sea, 
approximately 75-miles from the Chinese coastline.  The Pentagon released 
the following statement the day after the events:
The unprofessional maneuvers by Chinese vessels violated the 
requirement under international law to operate with due regard for the 
rights and safety of other lawful users of the ocean.  We expect Chinese 
ships to act responsibly and refrain from provocative activities that could 
lead to miscalculation or a collision at sea, endangering vessels and the 
lives of U.S. and Chinese mariners.81
For the United States, the kind of “harassment” pursued by China, 
including the dropping of pieces of wood in the Impeccable’s path and
forcing it to make an emergency stop, objectively constituted an 
77. U.S. Dep’t of State, Dispatch Supplement, Law of the Sea Convention: Letters of Transmittal 




78. Jon M. Van Dyke, Military Exclusion and Warning Zones on the High Seas, 15 MARINE POL’Y
147, 168 (1991).
79. Elliot L. Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other Traditional National Security 
Considerations, 19 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 553, 574 (1982).
80. See LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN, MEETING CHINA HALFWAY: HOW TO DEFUSE THE EMERGING US-
CHINA RIVALRY 287 (2015) (“[T]his sensitivity should not be at all surprising, given China’s experience 
with ‘gunboat diplomacy’, with coastal blockades after 1949, and with the fact that Hainan Island is the 
site of SSBN testing and future basing.”).
81. RAW DATA: Pentagon Statement on Chinese Incident with U.S. Navy, FOX NEWS (Mar. 9, 
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/09/raw-data-pentagon-statement-chinese-incident-
navy/ [https://perma.cc/XY98-W3D4].
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unreasonable interference that falls outside the ambit of PRC’s obligations 
under the “due regard” requirement.82
2. Permissivist Narrative of the Treaty Negotiations
Commander Jonathan Odom of the U.S. Navy JAG summarizes the 
United States’ position as to what actually unfolded at the UNCLOS III 
negotiations:
The nations at the bargaining table developed and refined a modification 
to the legal division of the oceans of the world which would become 
known as the exclusive economic zone.  The purpose of this modification 
was clear: to accommodate those coastal states desiring to preserve their 
economic rights in the waters off their respective coasts.  For activities 
which had no bearing on these economic rights, the nations at the 
bargaining table agreed to preserve the otherwise preexisting regime of 
high seas freedoms beyond the territorial seas of coastal states.  The 
concept of an exclusive economic zone was not intended to reserve any 
rights for coastal states other than the economic rights of the coastal state 
in those waters, as well as a narrow slice of associated jurisdiction for 
specific purposes, such as protection of the environment from major 
damage.  In fact, a handful of nations that attempted to insert a reference 
to the coastal state’s security interests in the “due regard” clause of the 
exclusive economic zone articles were roundly defeated during the 
negotiations.83
This depiction of the negotiations is slightly misconstrued.  As was 
already discussed above, the matter of military and electronic 
reconnaissance activities within the zone, was intentionally left out by the 
maritime superpowers during UNCLOS III.84 The United States was in fact 
the one who led the charge against any deliberation on the matter, its official 
delegate noting that:
The United States had consistently held that the conduct of military 
activities for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the Charter of the 
United Nations and with the principles of international law.  Any specific 
limitation on military activities would require the negotiation of detailed 
arms control agreement.  The Conference was not charged with such a 
purpose and was not prepared for such negotiations.  Any attempt to turn 
the Conference’s attention to such a complex task would quickly bring to 
82. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearing Before East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Subcomm. of the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (Statement of Scot Marciel, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary), reprinted in O’ROURKE, supra note 18, at 27 (“In March 2009, the survey ship 
USNS Impeccable was conducting routine operations, consistent with international law, in international 
waters in the South China Sea.  Actions taken by Chinese fishing vessels to harass the Impeccable put 
ships of both sides at risk, interfered with freedom of navigation, and were inconsistent with the 
obligation for ships at sea to show due regard for the safety of other ships.  We immediately protested 
those actions to the Chinese government, and urged that our differences be resolved through established 
mechanisms for dialogue—not through ship-to-ship confrontations that put sailors and vessels at risk.”) 
(emphasis added).
83. Odom, supra note 44, at 438.
84. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
36 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 57
an end current effort to negotiate a law of the sea convention.85
Nonetheless, according to the permissivist narrative, UNCLOS III 
hermetically settled the dispute regarding military activities within the zone, 
to the detriment of those few coastal States who sought broader jurisdiction.  
American commentators claim a near-unanimous resolve that existed 
during UNCLOS III to reject the attempts to “territorialize” the EEZ by 
incorporating the “security interests” of coastal States or limiting the 
navigational and overflight freedoms of third States.86 In this context, they 
refer to a number of countries, namely Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands, which have issued specific statements against potential 
“territorialization” of the zone upon ratification of UNCLOS.87
3. Permissivist Understanding of State Practice
This near-unanimity is also reflected, as permissivists contend, by 
State practice, both preceding and following the adoption of UNCLOS.  As 
one commentator suggests: “[t]he overwhelming majority of nations during 
the past three decades reflect that coastal States lack the authority to restrict 
foreign military activities within their respective EEZs.”88 Similarly, in the 
context of the airspace above the EEZ, commentators note that: “[s]ince the 
advent of aviation more than 100 years ago, military aircrafts have flown 
countless missions beyond national airspace, to include intelligence 
collection missions and military exercises along the outer limits of the 
territorial sea.”89
Permissivists thus claim that aerial, surface, and subsurface 
surveillance activities, conducted from beyond the territorial waters of 
another State, form part of an internationally accepted “routine.”90 The 
85. 5 UNCLOS III O.R. (67th plenary mtg.), ¶ 81.
86. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 24 (“[E]arly efforts by a handful of developing nations, like China, 
El Salvador, and Peru, to ‘territorialize’ the EEZ in order to broaden coastal-state authority in the new 
zone to include residual competences and rights (such as security interests) in [A]rticle 56 were rejected 
by the majority of the delegations at [UNCLOS III].”).
87. Peter A. Dutton, Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign 
Airspace 103(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 697–698 (2009) (“[U]pon ratification of the Convention, Germany 
specifically stated that ‘the notion of a 200-mile zone of general rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction 
of the coastal State cannot be sustained either in general international law or under the relevant 
provisions of the Convention.’  Likewise, the Italian declaration upon signature specified that the coastal 
state does not enjoy residual rights in the EEZ and has no authority under the Convention to require 
permission or notice of foreign military exercises or maneuvers in the EEZ.  The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom made similar statements.”).
88. Odom, supra note 44, at 440.
89. KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 15, at 292.
90. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 30 (“During the height of the Cold War, it was not uncommon for 
U.S. and NATO ships departing port to be met by a Soviet surveillance ship (AGI) at the outer edge of 
the territorial sea.  Such activities were acceptable so long as the Soviet AGIs complied with their 
obligations under the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and 
the U.S.-USSR Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas agreement (INCSEA).  The United 
States and its NATO allies responded to these activities with great tolerance.  For example, in February 
1974 a Soviet reconnaissance aircraft that was conducting a surveillance mission off the coast of Alaska 
ran low on fuel and had to make an emergency landing at Gambell Airfield in Alaska.  The crew 
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origins of this practice can be traced back to the Cold War, as suggested by 
Professor Lissitzyn:
Despite the tensions associated with the Cold War and similar political 
conflicts, states have generally refrained from claiming the legal right to 
interfere with foreign warships or aircraft outside their territorial seas or 
territorial airspace, even there were grounds for believing that the ships 
or aircraft were engaged in electronic reconnaissance in close proximity 
to the territory of the coastal state.91
More recent practice also seems to denote acceptance of such 
surveillance operations.  Consider, for example, the July 2007 Norwegian 
interception of the Russian Tupolev-95 (“Tu-95”) reconnaissance vessels 
above its EEZ; the August 2007 Canadian interception of Russian air jets 
just outside its aerial airspace near Newfoundland; or the September 2009 
U.K. Royal Air Force interception of eight Russian Tu-95s off its northern 
coast.  While in all three scenarios coastal States demanded explanations 
from Russia, they all seemed to accept Putin’s response that “Russia’s 
reconnaissance patrols are flown to protect shipping lanes and other vital 
Russian interests,” and that such patrols are done in accordance with 
international law, over neutral waters, and without violating the territorial 
borders of other States.92
Moreover, some commentators have pointed out the fact that even the 
PRC itself has engaged in surveillance activities within other coastal States’
EEZs.  Pedrozo lists dozens of Chinese incursions within foreign EEZs 
throughout the Asia-Pacific between 2003 and 2009.93 More recently, a 
few minor controversies erupted following China’s decision to dispatch 
remained overnight and was provided space heaters and food by the American personnel.  The plane 
was refueled the next day and allowed to depart without further incident. Similarly, in March 1994 a 
Russian surveillance aircraft monitoring a NATO antisubmarine warfare exercise ran low on fuel and 
made an emergency landing at Thule Air Base in Greenland.  Again, the crew was fed and the aircraft 
was refueled and allowed to depart without further delay.  In short, reconnaissance and surveillance 
activities at sea and in the air beyond the twelve-mile limit are nothing new and are well understood.”).
91. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Electronic Reconnaissance from the High Seas and International Law, 61 
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLL. INT’L. L. STUDIES 563, 566 (1979); see also Dutton, supra note 87, at 701–02.
92. Dutton, supra note 87 at 702–03.
93. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 30–32; cf. Zhang Haiwen, Is it Safeguarding the Freedom of 
Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States?—Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo’s Article 
on Military Activities in the EEZ, 9 CHIN. J. INT’L L. 31, 40 (2010) (“Pedrozo’s Article lists a large 
number of disputes between China and Japan as examples to illustrate that, like the United States, 
Chinese military vessels also conducted military survey and intelligence activities in the EEZs of other 
countries . . . there is an obvious cognitive error in the basic facts.  For example, in the list of 
cases . . . some cases occurred in the so-called ‘Japan’s EEZ south-southwest of the Oki-no-Tori Shima’ 
or ‘in the vicinity of Okinotia.’  For these cases, Pedrozo conveniently neglects a well-known fact, that 
is, a dispute over the Oki-no-Tori Shima between Japan on one side and China and the Republic of 
Korea on the other . . . .  China neither needs to submit any application to Japan nor needs its approval.  
It is obviously wrong for Pedrozo to simply equate the controversy on Oki-no-Tori Shima between 
China and Japan with that between China and the United States triggered by the United States military 
activities in Chinese EEZ.  Secondly, China and Japan have various kinds of maritime disputes, such as 
those regarding the sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands and delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf 
in the East China Sea.  Consequently, there is a dispute regarding jurisdiction over the activities in the 
disputed EEZ.  Thus, according to the Chinese position, China does not need to obtain permission from 
Japan for Chinese vessels to enter into the EEZ claimed by itself to conduct marine data collection.”).
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Auxiliary General Intelligence vessels to monitor western maritime 
exercises.  The first incident occurred in an area off the coast of Hawaii 
during the Rim of the Pacific Maritime Exercises of July 2014, and the 
second occurred off the Queensland coast in the vicinity of the Talisman 
Sabre defense exercises.94 Commentators have suggested this reflects a 
double standard on the part of China, and argue the Chinese have a choice 
“between breathtaking (and unsustainable) hypocrisy and accepting that 
China’s attitude to intelligence gathering in its own Exclusive Economic 
Zone must change.”95 Perhaps China’s recent engagement with EEZ 
surveillance is reflective of an evolution in policy, similar to the one taken 
by the Soviets in the 1960s.  In the wake of the U2 spy planes incident, the 
Soviets were quick to rely on international law to argue that surveillance in 
their territorial airspace violated their sovereignty and international law.  
Over time, however, and with the advancement of the Soviets’ own spying 
capabilities, the Soviets reverted back from this line of legal argumentation.  
This was codified in the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(“SALT I”), in which the United States and the U.S.S.R. put into writing 
their consent to spying on each other in the monitoring of strategic arms 
control.96
For permissivists, any acceptance of the Chinese legal position would 
result in detrimental consequences.  Given that EEZs encompass nearly 
40% of the world’s oceans, limiting freedom of navigation within foreign 
States’ zones would deny military ships and aircraft access to several bodies 
of water:
[A]ll of the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Sea 
of Japan, the Philippine Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Caribbean Sea, the 
North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the 
Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, most of Oceania, and large swathes of the 
Indian Ocean.  Such a result was clearly not envisioned during [UNCLOS 
III] and would never have been accepted by the maritime powers.97
B.  The Prohibitive Approach: Shackling the Dragon-Kings to Sovereign 
Cages
The determined struggle for 200-nautical-mile maritime rights initiated 
94. See, e.g., Erickson & de La Bruyere, supra note 18.
95. See, e.g., James Goldrick, China’s Intelligence Gathering at Sea: Some Implications, THE
INTERPRETER (July 24, 2017), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-intelligence-
gathering-sea-some-implications [https://perma.cc/K82P-69DR].  See also Panda, supra note 18 (“If 
Washington and its partners want to preserve the legal norm of freedom of navigation, however, they 
cannot begrudge the PLAN’s activities. Instead, when Beijing protests similar activities within its own 
EEZ in the South and East China Seas, there will be a clearer double standard that can be highlighted.”).
96. See generally Note, Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outerspace, 61 
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1074 (1961).
97. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 29.  For a map highlighting the world’s EEZ claims, see MAJ Chuah 
Meng Soon, Restrictions on Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Major Powers’ 
‘Lawfare’, 42 J. SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES 12, 19 (2016).
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by Latin American Countries has won increasing support among the 
numerous small and medium-sized countries . . . . [These countries] are 
waging a gigantic and vigorous struggle against the maritime hegemony 
of the superpowers.  With a view to seeking hegemony on the seas and 
oceans, the superpowers are trying in vain to preserve the outdated law 
of the sea and are doing their utmost to restrict the territorial sea and 
scope of jurisdiction of all countries . . . . They reflect the reality of the 
time when seas and oceans were controlled by colonialism and 
imperialism . . . . As to the assertion that the larger the territorial sea and 
the zones of jurisdiction, the smaller the open sea, the question must be 
asked: What is the open sea?  The so-called open sea has in fact always 
been the “private sea” of a few strong naval powers.  The numerous small 
and medium-sized countries have now stood up; they constitute the 
majority and demand a change in the so-called law of the sea, which is 
advantageous only to the imperialists. What fault can one find with 
this?98
In this decisive fashion, Chiao Kuan-hua, former PRC Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, addressed the 28th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly a mere ten months after the signing of UNCLOS.  His harsh 
words of rebuke were punctiliously selected, reflecting China’s dismay at 
what it considered the hypocrisy of the maritime powers.  From China’s 
viewpoint, the superpowers were masquerading themselves as the 
custodians of high seas freedoms, while their true motivations were to 
preserve their domination over “the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the 
Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, the Pacific and [the] Atlantic Ocean” and to 
extend “their rivalry in setting up bases and plundering the fishing and sea-
bed resources there.”99 Kuan-hua was determined to pierce this veil.  After 
being excluded from participation in the first and second conferences on the 
law of the sea, the PRC used the EEZ debate during UNCLOS III to emerge 
as a new leader for the developing world and a protector of coastal States’ 
sovereign rights.  While the PRC has since risen to the level of a maritime 
Jade Emperor, the mentality of colonialist victimhood, which was prevalent 
in the words advanced by Kuan-hua in 1973, still reflects modern-day 
Chinese dogmatic positions relating to the law of the sea.100
98. Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman, Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Plenary Meeting 




100. Wachman, supra note 20, at 111 (“Chinese advocates have adopted the perspective with 
respect to the EEZ that the PRC has taken in other international controversies involving powerful states.  
The PRC assumes the mantle of the underprivileged developing state confronting harassment from the 
far stronger, developed state . . . .  The PRC position is rife with implications of American hegemony 
reflecting, consciously or not, the well-trod narrative of China’s sufferings at the hands of Western 
imperialism.”); Haiwen, supra note 93, at 45 (“In the light of its strategic interests in maintaining global 
hegemony, any one of the military activities of the United States, including combat operations, of course, 
would be for ‘peaceful purposes’!  Has the United States ever considered or cared to some extent about 
how other countries in the world look at the hegemonic practices of the United States?  Considering the 
current status of ‘monopole dominance’ of the United States in international politics, it is obvious that 
the United States has no need to take into account all of this.”).  There are certainly actors within the 
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This historical imperial narrative is further enforced by China’s 
topographical reality.  As one commentator suggests, the two most 
significant physical features of China’s geography, the length of its 
coastline (tenth longest coastline in the world) and the size of its continental 
shelf (seventh largest in the world), “naturally led China to adopt a position 
favoring extensive coastal State jurisdiction” during and following 
UNCLOS III negotiations.101
After ratifying UNCLOS in 1996, the PRC promulgated more than 
thirty laws and regulations “covering the basic marine legal system, mineral 
resources, fishing, environmental protection and marine scientific research 
among others.”102 Most pertinent to this analysis is the 1998 Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf.103 The 
legislation emphasized the restrictions on third States’ activities within the 
zone and assigned extensive authorities to the PRC in this context.  Thus for 
example, while recognizing third States’ freedom of navigation, over-flight, 
and other lawful uses within the zone, the EEZ law subjected these freedoms 
to “international laws and the laws and regulations of the People’s Republic 
of China.”104 Furthermore, the PRC reserved the right, in the exercise of 
its sovereignty within the zone, to “take necessary measures against 
violations of [PRC] laws and regulations in the exclusive economic 
zone . . . and [to] exercise the right of hot pursuit;” such measures may 
include: “boarding, inspection, arrest, detention, and judicial processes, as 
may be necessary to ensure compliance.”105 Phrasing the law in this 
manner manifestly distinguished the high seas freedom of navigation and 
over-flight from its narrower, more constrained, and subjected-to-coastal-
State-supervision sister, the freedom of navigation and over-flight within 
the sui generis waters of the EEZ.106 This distinction stands at the heart of 
United States political scene who recognize this hegemonic power and base their UNCLOS 
interpretation in accordance with it.  See, e.g., SCOTT G. BERGERSON, THE NATIONAL INTERESTS AND 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 17 (2009), http://www.cfr.org/oceans/national-interest-law-sea/p19156 
[https://perma.cc/S5DR-JBMF] (“Opponents of the [UNCLOS] convention argue that there is no need 
to join the treaty because, with the world’s hegemonic navy, the United States can treat the parts of the 
convention it likes as customary international law, following the convention’s guidelines when it suits 
American interests and pursuing a unilateral course of action when it does not.”).
101. Gao, supra note 53, at 272.
102. Guoxing, supra note 42, at 21.
103. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental 
Shelf (June 26, 1998), translated and reprinted in PARK HEE KWON, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND 
NORTHEAST ASIA: A CHALLENGE FOR COOPERATION 152–55 (2000).
104. Id. art. 11 (“All states, subject to international laws and the laws and regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China, enjoy the freedoms of navigation and over-flight in its exclusive economic zone and 
of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms 
in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf of the People’s Republic of China.”).
105. Id. art. 12.
106. Guoxing, supra note 42, at 20–21 (“At present the United States regards the freedom of 
navigation in exclusive economic zones as equal to the freedom of navigation on high seas; but this is 
in conflict with the UNCLOS.  Although the Convention grants freedom of navigation in the EEZ, such 
freedom is subject to the resource-related and environment-related laws and regulations of the coastal 
state.  According to Article 58, in the exclusive economic zone, all States enjoy the freedoms of 
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prohibitionists’ responses to the permissivists’ claims discussed above.
1. Prohibitive Reading of Ordinary Meaning, Object, and Purpose
While some prohibitionists take an extreme view, which equates 
“peaceful purposes” with demilitarization of the EEZ,107 this is not the 
typical approach.  Prohibitionists accept that all vessels, including military 
vessels, enjoy the freedom of navigation within and above the EEZ.108 The 
debate concerns, however, what that freedom entails today in a post-
UNCLOS world. As noted by one commentator:
[T]he Law of the Sea Convention formulated and agreed on a myriad of 
maritime zones . . . . In my mind it would be very difficult now to say 
that the freedom of the seas is still as before. I would even say that the 
freedom of the sea has become a highly regulated sea. From all sides and 
all kinds of views there is highly regulated use . . . it is not as free as it 
was anymore.109
Prohibitionists cite the balancing limitations on the freedom of 
navigation in the EEZ, namely “lawful use” and “peaceful purposes,” and 
expand them as far as legally possible.  In this context, prohibitionists argue 
that the collection of military intelligence “openly encroach[es] on the 
national security and peaceful order” of the coastal State and should thus 
constitute a threat of force against territorial integrity in violation of U.N. 
Charter Article 2(4).110
Prohibitionists further stress the fact that UNCLOS was developed, in 
part, to allow the “strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and friendly 
relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of justice.”111
Considering this, Chinese prohibitionists raise the question of whether 
letting the United States fly more than “400 reconnaissance missions per 
navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, but when exercising their rights, 
‘States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws 
and regulations adopted by the coastal State.’  Thus, the United States enjoys the freedom of overflight 
and navigation in China’s EEZ, but such freedom is not unrestricted, and US aircraft and vessels must 
observe the relevant Chinese laws.”).
107. Li Guang-Yi, Legal Problem of Military Use in Exclusive Economic Zone, 2 J. OF XI’AN POL.
54, 57 (2005) (suggesting that “the substantial spirit of the ‘for peaceful purposes only’ principle is 
complete demilitarization”).  This approach attempts to tie the EEZ by analogy to other regimes in which 
demilitarization was adopted, or at least attempted, namely the regimes governing the Antarctic and the 
outer space and moon.  See Francioni, supra note 14, at 222.
108. Haiwen, supra note 93, at 47 (“[A]lthough China opposes engaging in military activities in its 
EEZ without its consent, this is not directly equal to ‘military ships and aircraft of all nations would be 
denied access to all of the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Sea of Japan, Philippine 
Sea . . .’ which is mentioned by Pedrozo.  That all vessels of all countries enjoy the freedom of 
navigation in its EEZ is a generally accepted rule and legal regime under the Convention.  China never 
attempts to challenge this rule.”).
109. Hasjim Djalal, Remarks on the Concept of “Freedom of Navigation”, in FREEDOM OF SEAS,
PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 65, 69–70 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. 
eds., 2009).
110. Guoxing, supra note 42, at 20–22.
111. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at pmbl.
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year around China, an average of over one per day,”112 is a political reality 
that sits well with the original goals and purposes of UNCLOS.  This type 
of narrowing of maritime States’ freedoms is also reflected in the 
prohibitionists’ interpretation of the terms “MSR” and “due regard,” as 
defined under UNCLOS.
i.  “Marine Scientific Research” within the EEZ
As a starting point, prohibitionists reject any categorization of specific 
types of marine data collection activities, such as hydrographic, military,
and research surveys.113 Although elsewhere in UNCLOS some of these 
activities are indeed mentioned separately, within the EEZ regime of 
UNCLOS Part V,114 survey activities are not distinguished by type, and 
therefore, they argue, should all be governed by the jurisdiction of the 
coastal State.115 This convergence in the legal understanding of these 
activities is also justified for practical reasons, as there is simply no way to 
draw sharp distinctions between these activities from a technical point of 
view.116 Dr. Bateman, formerly with the Australian Royal Navy, has for 
example concluded that: “marine scientific research, hydrographic 
surveying and military surveys all overlap to some extent.  Some so-called 
military surveys, particularly military oceanographic research, are virtually
the same as marine scientific research.”117 He also stated elsewhere that: 
“hydrographic surveying and marine scientific research are both similar and 
relatively recent innovations.  Furthermore, technological developments 
with marine scientific research equipment in recent decades have made this 
similarity even more the case than it may have been at the time of UNCLOS 
112. Ji Guoxing, Rough Waters in the South China Sea: Navigation Issues and Confidence-Building 
Measures, 53 ASIA PAC. ISSUES 1, 4 (2001).
113. Haiwen, supra note 93, at 42 (“The international law of the sea, namely the Convention, has 
only provided different rules for marine data collection at different locations, and it has not provided a 
categorization for each kind of marine data collection activity.  This factor is exactly the main cause that 
leads to the international disagreement on jurisdiction over the military activities, such as collection of 
marine data for military purposes in EEZs.”).
114. Sam Bateman, A Response to Pedrozo: The Wider Utility of Hydrographic Surveys, 10(1) 
CHIN. J. INT’L L. 177, 179 (2011) (“Pedrozo also claims that ‘marine scientific research’ and ‘surveys’ 
are different because they are sometimes referred to separately in UNCLOS.  However, I believe this is 
an over-reading of the Convention.  The use of separate terms provides a ‘catch-all’ phrase for the types 
of research activities that are either prohibited or require the authorization of the coastal State in 
particular circumstances.  It is also significant that all the separate references to surveying activities are 
in the context of the passage regimes in UNCLOS rather than with regard to rights and duties in an EEZ.  
The main intent of the drafters of the Convention seems to have been more with prohibiting ships from 
conducting research or surveys during their passage through a territorial sea, a strait used for 
international navigation or archipelagic waters rather than with establishing a separate regime for 
hydrographic surveying.”).
115. Jilu, supra note 61, at 71.
116. Haiwen, supra note 93, at 42.
117. Sam Bateman, Hydrographic Surveying in the EEZ: Differences and Overlaps with Marine 
Scientific Research, 29 MARINE POL’Y 163, 172 (2005).  It should be noted, however, that Bateman 
does distinguish in particular intelligence collection as an activity that is separate, both in nature and in 
the technology it employs, from other marine surveying.  Id.
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III.”118
When UNCLOS was drafted, hydrographic surveys effectively “had to 
be conducted with the consent of the coastal [S]tate as the surveys involved 
participation from land.”119 Clearly, then, the original intention of the 
drafters was to consider these surveys, when conducted by third parties, as 
falling under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, since there was no other 
way of conducting them at the time.  Why then should the introduction of 
the GPS in the 1990s (which alleviated any need for coastal State 
involvement and opened up the possibility for hydrographic surveying 
without that country’s knowledge)120 now be exploited by maritime powers 
to evade the jurisdiction of the coastal State?
One commentator also suggests that creating a separate category of 
“military activities,” immune from scrutiny, will only induce States to 
rename certain vessels and activities disingenuously, in order to circumvent 
legal constraints imposed by coastal States.121 Another commentator notes
that military hydrographic survey activities should in fact be viewed as a 
“type of battlefield preparation, and thus a threat of force against the coastal 
State . . . violating the principle of peaceful use of the sea.”122
For the reasons mentioned above, China enacted the “Surveying and 
Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China” by Presidential order in 
2002.123 The law elaborated on the notion of surveying and mapping cited 
in the prior 1998 law, clarifying that “all surveying and mapping activities 
in the territorial air, land and waters of the People’s Republic of China, as 
well as other sea areas under its jurisdiction,” are bound by the provisions 
of Chinese law.124 Any such surveying and mapping activity must first 
obtain the approval of the competent authorities in the PRC.  Operating 
without this permission would result in a fine of 500,000 yuan and expulsion 
118. Sam Bateman, Hydrographic Surveying and Marine Scientific Research in Exclusive 
Economic Zones, in FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
105, 122 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009).  Bateman also challenges the contention raised above 
by Pedrozo (supra note 69 and accompanying text) that hydrographic and MSR activities can be 
distinguished by their intended use.  As countered by Bateman: “Indeed it makes no practical sense to 
suggest that the modern hydrographic surveying vessel will be restricting its operations purely to 
information required for the safety of navigation.”  Bateman, supra.
119. KLEIN, supra note 40, at 222.
120. Bateman, supra note 117, at 168.
121. Yu Zhirong, Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Military Surveys in the Exclusive 
Economic Zones of Coastal Countries, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE 
ON SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 37, 44 (Peter Dutton ed., 2010).  
Zhirong specifically refers to a U.S. maritime research vessel, the R/G Roger Revelle, which, while 
being marked as belonging to “Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California,” was 
owned by the U.S. Navy, and its use was approved by the Navy.  Therefore, it met the requirements for 
an allegedly free from scrutiny “military survey,” as opposed to an MSR, which requires prior consent.  
Id.
122. Gao, supra note 53, at 289.
123. Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President No. 
75) (Aug. 29, 2002), http://english1.english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/09/content_75314.htm
[https://perma.cc/FJ57-XMCC].
124. Id. art. 2. (emphasis added)
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from the country.125 Furthermore, the law makes clear that any such 
surveying or mapping “may not involve State secrets or endanger State 
security,” further suggesting a strict prohibition on intelligence gathering 
for military purposes.126
ii.  “Due regard” obligations within the EEZ
Prohibitionist scholars ascribe great weight to the “due regard” 
obligations of third States within the EEZ.  According to their interpretation 
of the term, States are bound to refrain from any acts which might adversely 
affect the use of the EEZ by nationals of other States.127
This is of particular pertinence in the context of third States’ over-flight
freedoms above the zone. Articles 2 and 49 of UNCLOS128 and Article 1 
of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago 
Convention”)129 reserve the airspace above the territorial sea and 
archipelagic waters to the sovereignty of the coastal/archipelagic State.  
However, this does not extend beyond the twelve nautical-mile limit.  
Therefore, unlike the waters of the zone, the coastal State lacks “a legal 
basis for regulating military activities in the airspace above the EEZ.”130
The standard of “due regard” becomes the primary, if not sole, tool used by 
coastal States to limit third States’ use of its EEZ airspace.
125. Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 26.
126. Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 123, art. 7.
127. See James Kraska, Resources Rights and Environmental Protection in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 75, 83 (Peter Dutton ed., 2010) (paraphrasing the 
standard set by the International Law Commission in its Commentary with regards to the High Sea).
128. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 2(1) (“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land 
territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea”); art. 2(2) (“This sovereignty extends to the air space 
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil”); art. 49(2) (“This sovereignty extends to the air 
space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained 
therein”).
129. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295 (“The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”); see also art. 3(d) (“The contracting States undertake, 
when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation 
of civil aircraft”).
130. Pedrozo, supra note 16, at 12.  A similar conclusion was reached by the Secretariat of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) in a 1987 study he conducted:
[F]or the purpose of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other international air law 
instruments, the exclusive economic zone is deemed to have the same legal status as the high 
seas and any reference in these instruments to the high seas should be deemed to encompass 
the exclusive economic zone.
Secretariat Study, Consideration of the Report of the Rapporteur on United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea - Implications, if any, for the Application of the Chicago Convention, Its Annexes and 
Other International Air Law Instruments, Legal Committee, 26th Sess., ICAO Doc. No. LC/26-WP/5-1 
(Feb. 4, 1987).  With regards to this study, Williams notes that: “The study’s results have not been 
challenged, disputed, or superseded. ICAO did not further pursue the matter, and the study’s results 
inform ICAO’s governance to this day. ICAO’s jurisdiction to legislate Rules of the Air over all areas 
previously considered high seas, to include the EEZ, continues unabated.”  Williams, supra note 52, at 
53.
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While the permissivist approach seems to denote that the “due regard” 
standard should be equated with a technical and objective analysis of 
reasonableness, law of the sea jurisprudence takes a far less stringent route.  
In the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United 
Kingdom), the Annex VII Tribunal clarified the following:
[T]he ordinary meaning of “due regard” calls for [State A] to have such 
regard for the rights of [State B] as is called for by the circumstances and 
by the nature of those rights. The Tribunal declines to find in this 
formulation any universal rule of conduct. The Convention does not 
impose a uniform obligation to avoid any impairment of [State B’s] 
rights; nor does it uniformly permit the [State A] to proceed as it wishes, 
merely noting such rights. Rather, the extent of the regard required by the 
Convention will depend upon the nature of the rights held by [State B], 
their importance, the extent of the anticipated impairment, the nature and 
importance of the activities contemplated by [State A], and the 
availability of alternative approaches.131
Far from just a technical analysis of reasonableness, the Tribunal 
recognized the need to engage in a “balance of interests,” a contextual 
analysis of the coastal State’s rights (which could potentially take into 
account its subjective “eggshell skull”), and most importantly a requirement 
of proportionality.  The use of the phrase “availability of alternative 
approaches,” coupled with the requirement to examine “anticipated 
impairment” versus the “importance of the activities,” echoes what Aharon 
Barak might call “necessity” and “proportionality” stricto sensu.  For 
prohibitionists, such an open-ended test does leave room for “due regard” 
to potentially limit certain military and surveillance activities in the zone.132
2. Prohibitive Narrative of the Treaty Negotiations
Prohibitionists suggest that it is a misrepresentation of history to argue 
that the “majority of delegates” during UNCLOS III negotiations had 
indeed supported the U.S. position regarding coastal State security claims 
within the zone.133 In the name of multilateral compromise, UNCLOS III 
delegates declined to reach a resolution on this matter.134 To establish this 
theory, prohibitionists rely on the comments made by Tommy T.B. Koh, 
President of UNCLOS III, who had remarked on the issue in a Panel of the 
Center for Oceans Law and Policy in 2009:
The legal status of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was another very 
131. In re The Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, ¶ 519 (March 18, 2015), 
http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK8Y-
AF39].
132. See generally Ahron Barak, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS 317–79 (2012).  Note in particular the similarities and distinctions that Barak draws 
between proportionality and reasonableness.  Id.
133. Haiwen, supra note 93, at 33.
134. See supra notes 13–14, 86 and accompanying text.
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contentious issue . . . . On this issue there were also strongly held and 
opposing views.  Some coastal States would like the status of the EEZ to 
approximate legal status of the territorial sea.  Many other states held the 
view that the rights of the coastal States and the EEZ are limited to the 
exploitation of living and non-living resources . . . . On this issue. . .
there was no agreement.  Castañada (Dr. Jorge Castañada, leader of the 
Mexican delegation to UNCLOS III - A.L.) and a Norwegian colleague, 
submitted a compromise text to the Conference.  The text was strongly 
debated but found very wide acceptance.  Not universal acceptance, but 
wide acceptance.  There were friends on both sides who did not agree 
with the compromise text and held onto their strongly held initial 
positions.135
3. Prohibitive Understanding of State Practice
Prohibitionists raise a post-colonial TWAIL-like critique of the notion 
that broad state practice actually exists to support third State military 
maneuvers within the zone. The following rhetorical question was raised 
by Dr. Haiwen, deputy director of the China Institute for Marine Affairs: 
“May I ask whether, throughout history, except for the United States and 
other developed countries, there are any developing coastal States who 
wantonly conducted marine data collection and military activities in the 
waters beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of developed countries?”136
This seems to tie neatly to an earlier statement by Kuan-hua to the effect 
that there are no “open sea” freedoms, there is only a “private sea,” 
controlled by those who have, to the disadvantage of those who do not.
It is on this basis that eighteen coastal States, Brazil, Uruguay, Kenya, 
Cape Verde, Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Malaysia, Vietnam, North Korea and China, all claim a security 
interest in the EEZ, “typically by restricting foreign flagged military 
activities” within and above the zone.137 To establish these claims, many 
135. Tommy T.B. Koh, Remarks on the Legal Status of the Exclusive Economic Zone, in FREEDOM 
OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 53, 53–54 (Myron H. 
Nordquist et al. eds., 2009) (emphasis added); see also id. at 47 (“Pedrozo states that ‘[t]he position 
ultimately accepted by the overwhelming majority of the delegations at UNCLOS III was that military 
operations, exercises and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea 
and that the right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all states in the EEZ.’  
However, he fails to provide evidence to prove his point of view.  How ‘overwhelming’ was that 
‘majority’?  Exactly which delegations did that ‘majority’ consist of?  Contrary to his argument, no 
express agreement could be reached on this issue at that time, much less could this position be ‘accepted 
by the overwhelming majority of the delegations’.”).
136. Haiwen, supra note 93, at 37; see also Felipe H. Paolillo, The Exclusive Economic Zone in 
Latin American Practice and Legislation, 26 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 105, 107–08 (1995) (“It should 
not be surprising, then, that coastal states tend to respond to the questions that the Convention left 
unanswered or with respect to which participants at the Conference were forced to resort to ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ by developing a practice that better meets their national interests.”).
137. KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 15, at 277–78; see also Guoxing, supra note 42, at 22 (“Since 
the formulation of the Convention, there have existed two opposite standpoints on the matter.  The 
coastal states including Brazil, Cape Verde, Uruguay, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and China 
oppose the military and information activities of other countries in their EEZs, which, they argue, 
jeopardize their security and violate the fundamental principle for peaceful uses of the seas”); Stephen 
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of these States introduced security-related provisions into their domestic 
EEZ legislation.138 While at present this legislation “could well be 
construed as in violation of international law,”139 it does suggest a lack of 
unanimity with regards to the current formulation of the rules.  In the words 
of Galdorisi and Kaufman, the significant coastal State domestic legislation
notes that “the Convention is not the last and final word on the customary 
law of the sea in this area.”140 Far from acquiescing to third States’ 
intelligence gathering activities within their zones, coastal States have 
attempted, through “strong domestic laws,”141 to turn the EEZ into a “zone 
of absolute State control: in effect, an area of sovereignty.”142
Coastal States have responded in other ways as well, however. 
Consider, for example, the following incidents from the last two decades: 
the Peruvian Attack on a U.S. C-130 State Aircraft (1992);143 Peruvian 
refusal to permit entry into the Peruvian Oceanic Flight Information Region 
for two U.S. C-130 State Aircraft (1995);144 Chinese Jianheu III-Class 
frigate interception of the USNS Bowditch (T-AGS 62) hydrographic 
survey ship in the Yellow Sea (2001);145 the collision between a U.S. Navy 
EP-3E ARIES Signals Intelligence aircraft and a PRC interceptor fighter jet 
off Hainan Islands (2001);146 the Impeccable Incident (2009);147 Chinese 
Navy harassment of the Indian Naval ship Airavat in the South China Sea 
Rose, Naval Activity in the EEZ - Troubled Water Ahead?, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 67, 134 (1990).
138. For a review of this legislation, see, e.g., KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 15, at 277–78; 
Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 282–83 (“Uruguay, for example, takes the position that the 
Convention does not explicitly permit the same range of uses associated with warship operation in the 
EEZ as are permitted on the high seas.  Brazil has enacted domestic legislation that states: ‘In the 
exclusive economic zone, military maneouvres [sic], in particular those involving the use of weapons or 
explosives, may only be carried out by other States with the consent of the Brazilian Government.’  By 
legislation enacted on May 2, 1993, Iran flatly prohibited ‘foreign military activities and practices’ 
within its EEZ.  Similarly, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan have all made claims that would restrict naval 
activities in their EEZs without prior permission.”).
139. KLEIN, supra note 40, at 47.
140. Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 283.
141. Id. at 288.
142. Robert Nedelson, The Exclusive Economic Zone State Claims - and the LOS Convention, 16
MARINE POL’Y 463, 483 (1992).
143. KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 15, at 230 (“On April 25, 1992, Peruvian fighter jets shot at 
a U.S. Propeller-driven C-130 aircraft that was conducting a routine counterdrug surveillance mission 
off the Peruvian Coast, but outside of Peru’s territorial sea and national airspace.  One crewmember was 
killed; two were injured.  The U.S. airplane was forced to make an emergency landing at a small airstrip 
in Talara, Peru, near the border with Ecuador.  Although Peru expressed regret for the incident, Peruvian 
Authorities justified their action by alleging that the U.S. aircraft was hundreds of miles off course and 
that it had failed to respond to several attempts to establish visual and radio warnings by the two fighter 
jets.”)
144. Id.. at 230–31 (“[I]n 1995 two C-130s were require to abort their mission after Peruvian refusal 
to permit entry into the Flight Information Region (FIR) without diplomatic clearance.  The flight 
controllers demanded that the aircraft remain west of 90 degrees west longitude- 650 nautical-miles 
from the Peruvian coastline.”).
145. Raul Pedrozo, Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident, 60 NAVAL WAR C.
REV. 101, 101 (2009).
146. Hayashi, supra note 8, at 130–35.
147. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
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(2011);148 Chinese Navy Ship harassment of a U.S. Navy guided missile 
cruiser Cowpens in the South China Sea (CG-63) (2013);149 European 
Responses to Russian aerial and naval “brinkmanship” policy following the 
Ukrainian Crisis (2014);150 the Chinese fighter interception of a U.S. Navy 
P-8 maritime patrol aircraft east of Hainan Islands (2014);151 a Chinese 
fighter’s engagement in what Americans referred to as “unsafe maneuvers” 
near a U.S. RC-135 surveillance aircraft above the Yellow Sea (2015);152
the interception of a U.S. Navy EP-3 by two Chinese Shenyang J-11 fighters 
over the South China Sea, with one fighter coming within fifty feet of the 
aircraft (2016);153 the interception of a U.S. RC-135 by a Chengdu J-10
fighter within 100 feet over the East China Sea (2016);154 and the 
interception of a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft over the East China Sea by 
Chinese fighter jets (2017).155 To this list we should add that a number of 
coastal States “have issued diplomatic protests when U.S. Naval vessels 
have operated in their EEZ,” the biggest protester being India.156 This 
enumeration, and in particular the recent rise in the quantity and intensity 
of incidents, would seem to suggest that the EEZ surveillance question is 
far from resolved.
Finally, with regard to the argument of a “double standard” by the 
PRC, at least two different explanations can be put forward with regard to 
the logic behind PRC’s surveillance in American, and more recently 
Australian, EEZs.  One commentator captured the first explanation by 
suggesting, “I demand freedom from you in the name of your principles.  I 
deny it to you in the name of mine.”157 Under this logic the Chinese 
interpretation of UNCLOS’ EEZ provisions is one which grants the coastal 
148. O’ROURKE, supra note 18, at 11.
149. Id. at 10.
150. Lizzie Dearden, Full List of Incidents Involving Russian Military and Nato Since March 2014,
THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 10, 2014), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/full-list-of-incidents-
involving-russian-military-and-nato-since-march-2014-9851309.html [https://perma.cc/6DJD-XGUL]; 
see also, Frear, Kulesa & Kearns, Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia 
and the West in 2014, EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK (Nov., 2014) 
www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2014/11/09/6375e3da/Dangerous%20Brinkmanshi
p.pdf [https://perma.cc/238Y-EAV9].





156. Guoxing, supra note 42, at 21; Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South China Seas: 
Hearing Before the H. Joint Subcomm. of Foreign Affairs Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific & Armed 
Services Subcomm. on Seapower & Projection Forces, 113th Cong., at 4 (2014) (statement of Jeff M. 
Smith, Director of South Asia Programs, American Policy Council), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20140114/101643/HHRG-113-FA05-Wstate-SmithJ-
20140114.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YQA-S8QJ] (“The important distinction is that while some countries 
have issued diplomatic protests when U.S. naval vessels have operated in their EEZ without consent, 
only China has ‘operationally challenged’ U.S. warships on multiple occasions, resulting in several 
dangerous confrontations at sea, the most recent involving the USS Cowpens in December, 2013.”) 
[hereinafter Testimony of the Director of South Asia Programs].
157. See, e.g., Erickson & Bruyere, supra note 18.
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State the power to enforce its security interests in the zone.  But that is the 
prerogative of the coastal State.  To the extent that that State decides not to 
adopt such policies, third States retain their complete freedom of navigation 
rights.  In other words, China is entitled to spy in America’s EEZ because 
the latter did not adopt legislation to the contrary, but the United States is 
forbidden from doing the same in China’s EEZ because China has legislated 
in that fashion.158 An alternative explanation could be simple 
countermeasures.  Under international law, an injured State may take 
actions against the State who has committed an internationally wrongful act 
in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations.159 From the 
perspective of China, spying in the EEZ of the United States would thus be 
a wrongful act, the wrongfulness of which is nullified, as its purpose is to 
induce the United States to end its wrongful activity, its very surveillance 
in China’s EEZ.
***
A significant number of legal scholars have tended to “support the 
legality of intelligence gathering by third states in the EEZ.”160
Nonetheless, when permissivist and prohibitionist arguments are 
considered side-by-side, they seem to balance each other off.  This makes 
sense, given the fact that the subject matter for treaty interpretation in our 
analysis (i.e. intelligence gathering under UNCLOS) is an “unspecified grey 
area” left intentionally unresolved by the drafters.161 Relying on traditional 
treaty interoperation approaches seems only to further anchor permissivist 
and prohibitionist scholars to their “high horse of principle.”162 In this 
context, the November 2014 US-China Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on Air and Maritime Encounters, which was praised by some as a 
positive step towards stability and cooperation in the region, did not resolve 
the core of the issue at hand.  As noted by Dr. Valencia:
The MOU has several weaknesses.  For starters the annex on air-to-air 
encounters has yet to be completed, indicating continuing disagreement 
in this sphere.  Moreover, the agreement is “not intended to be binding 
under international law” and can be discontinued by either side.  But the 
most glaring loophole is that the agreement is made “without prejudice” 
158. Id.
159. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 49(1) (Nov. 2001).
160. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 40, at 221; KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 15, at 311–12; Kaye, 
supra note 7, at 104; Hayashi, supra note 8, at 130; Elmar Rauch, Military Uses of the Oceans, 28 
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 229, 252 (1985); Walter F. Doran, An Operational Commander’s Perspective 
on the 1982 LOS Convention, 10 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 335, 335 (1995); Barbara  
Kwiatkowska, Military Uses in  the  EEZ - a Reply, 11 MARINE  POL’Y 249, 250 (1987); Jean-Pierre 
Quéneudec, Zone Economique Exclusive et Forces Aéronavales, in THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMANITY’S
RESOURCES: THE LAW OF THE SEA 319, 322–24 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1982).
161. Guoxing, supra note 42, at 22; see supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
162. Wachman, supra note 20, at 111.
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to either side’s starkly different policy perspectives on military activities 
in China’s EEZ . . . .  According to General Fan Changlong, Vice 
Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission “the United States 
should halt its ‘close-in’ aerial and naval surveillance of China.” . . . .  In 
practical terms, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Chief of Naval 
Operations said, “we’ll continue to operate in international airspace; we 
made that clear and we’ll proceed ahead.”  These differences are crystal 
clear and remain unaddressed.163
In any event, future reliance on that agreement to further consolidate 
around rules of the road seems looming, as the Trump Administration 
recently launched its first Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in 
the South China Sea since taking office.  The operation signaled more of 
the same from the American administration and provoked a predictable 
condemnation and protest from the PRC.164 Moreover, a recent tweet from 
President Trump on the North Korea issue seemed to suggest greater 
antagonism and a lack of potential cooperation with Pyongyang.165
One of the greatest contributions of Peruvian Ambassador Jorge 
Castañeda, during UNCLOS III treaty negotiations was the introduction of 
the wording to UNCLOS Article 59.  The Article aimed to address the 
delicate problem of “residual rights” within the zone, stressing that: 
In cases where [UNCLOS] does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the
coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and 
a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other 
State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and 
163. Mark J. Valencia, The US-China MOU on Air and Maritime Encounters, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 
17, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-us-china-mou-on-air-and-maritime-encounters/ 
[https://perma.cc/83CA-K5MY] (emphasis added); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 80, at 287–88 
(“[W]e may wish to think that tensions will dissipate if we develop such ‘codes of conduct’ or ‘rules of 
the road,’ but one cannot remove the strategic, political, and indeed symbolic ramifications of close-in 
surveillance without addressing them head on.”).
164. Julian Ku, The US Conducts the First South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operation of 
the Trump Era, but It Was “Off the Record”, Lawfare (25 May 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-
conducts-first-south-china-sea-freedom-navigation-operation-trump-era-it-was-record 
[https://perma.cc/VS38-H43S ] (The off-the-record approach “makes sense if the intended audience of 
a FONOP is only the other country whose legal claim you are challenging (in this case, China).  Indeed, 
the FONOP program was created in 1979 with little fanfare and many FONOPs are conducted every 
year all over the world without any public notice except by the countries involved.  But FONOPs in the 
South China Sea are no longer just elegant forms of state-to-state legal dialogues.  They have, for better 
or for worse, become the main vehicle for the U.S. government to signal its commitment to maintaining 
a presence in the South China Sea amidst China’s expansive land-reclamations and growing naval 
presence . . . .  Of course, there is one more unintended consequence of leaking the details of FONOPs: 
China now must publicly react lest it be seen as not sufficiently attentive to its own sovereignty. So, as 
if on cue, China’s Ministry of National Defense denounced the USS Dewey operation as ‘muscle-
flexing’ while China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed ‘strong dissatisfaction’ while announcing 
the Dewey was ‘expelled.’  But this sharp public reaction of the Chinese government will now lead to 
even more pressure on the Trump Administration to demonstrate even more firmness with even more 
FONOPs, lest the U.S. be seen as backing down to the Chinese.  (Rinse, wash, and repeat.).”).
165. Jacob Pramuk, Trump Suggests the Pressure on China over North Korea May Just be 
Beginning, CNBC (July 5, 2017 12:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/05/trump-north-korea-
tweets-suggest-more-action-against-china-may-come.html [https://perma.cc/79Z8-7BFH] (citing 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/882560030884716544 [https://perma.cc/SUL5-GNKU] 
(“So much for China working with us – but we had to give it a try!”)).
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in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the 
respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to 
the international community as a whole.166
As explained by Ambassador Castañeda:
The central problem was still the “residual rights” not attributed 
specifically by the Convention either to coastal States o[r] to third States.  
These rights could refer to future activities, such as uses of the sea not 
yet discovered or certain military uses not contemplated in the draft 
Convention, but traditionally practiced without any restriction by military 
powers in the high seas.167
This guideline for resolution of disputes within the zone seems relevant 
in addressing the EEZ surveillance issue.168 If we accept that intelligence 
gathering within the zone was intentionally left outside the ambit of 
UNCLOS, and if we consider the vast technological advancements that 
have taken place since the adoption of UNCLOS, there could be a basis to 
argue that third States’ surveillance within the EEZ should be understood 
as a “residual right”.169 Therefore a contextual analysis of particular 
intelligence operations is crucial in determining their legitimacy.  It is not a 
binary world, as permissivists and prohibitionists would have us believe.  
We need to consider the functional purpose of intelligence in international 
law, and international maritime law in particular, and examine the factual 
matrix surrounding each intelligence operation in light of general principles 
of equity and the interests of the international community writ large.170
This kind of multifaceted review of the EEZ surveillance conundrum is 
attempted in Sections III and IV of this paper.
III. BETWEEN DRAGON-KINGS, SOARING SNAKES, AND EARTHWORMS
As we have thus far seen, the discourse over intelligence gathering in 
166. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 59.
167. Jorge Castañeda, Negotiations on the Exclusive Economic Zone at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED 
LACHS 605, 620 (Makarczyk ed., 1984).
168. Id. at 614 (“Precisely, because the zone was defined as a sui generis zone, which was neither 
territorial sea nor high seas, it was indispensable to rely on some guideline or criterion to settle disputes 
that might arise out of concurrent uses of the sea within the exclusive economic zone, that is by the 
presence of competitive rights between the coastal State and the other States.”); 3 EDWARD D. BROWN,
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A GUIDE FOR NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 171 (1991) (“Opinions differ as to whether such military uses of 
the EEZ is a freedom or lawful use attributed to other States in Article 58 of the UN Convention or an 
unattributable or residual use under Article 59.”); Pedrozo, supra note 48, at 24 (“China’s current efforts 
to use article 59 to argue that it retains certain residual rights in the EEZ is simply an attempt to resurrect 
the argument it made and lost at UNCLOS III regarding security interests in the EEZ.  China’s effort to 
include security interests in the bundle of rights retained by the coastal state in the EEZ was rejected at 
UNCLOS III.  Therefore, there is no conflict with regard to coastal-state security interests to resolve 
under article 59 – such interests simply do not exist in the EEZ.”).
169. Consider, however, that UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b) specifically excludes military activities 
by government vessels and aircraft as well as disputes concerning enforcement activities in the exercise 
of sovereign rights from the jurisdiction of UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanism.  UNCLOS, supra 
note 11, art. 298(1)(b).  Therefore, there is room to challenge the applicability of Article 59 in this light.
170. VICUÑA, supra note 13, at 35.
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the EEZ has been, to a large extent, subsumed by the broader discourse over 
military activities within and above the zone.  Insufficient attention has 
therefore been given to the lex specialis of the International Law of 
Intelligence (“ILI”) in addressing this pertinent question.  This is 
disconcerting, as the Dragon-Kings are not any different than their brothers 
and sisters, the Soaring Snakes (“Tengshe”) or the Earthworms 
(“Dilong”).171 Indeed, naval reconnaissance is only one aspect within a 
broader canopy of intelligence gathering options available to States, from 
aerial surveillance to the sending of spies, and from governmental hacking 
to the gathering of information in the course of regular diplomatic 
engagements.  Any conclusion as to which reconnaissance activity
constitutes or should constitute an “international lawful use” (i.e. which 
activities serve or should be deemed to serve “peaceful purposes”) must 
draw its guidance from a broader analysis of the permissibility and legality 
of intelligence collection, as a whole, under international law.
The difficulty, however, in approaching this kind of an analysis is that 
traditional wisdom assumes that intelligence gathering seems to exist in a 
“legal penumbra, lying at the margins of diverse legal regimes and at the 
edge of international legitimacy.”172  This ominous contention is one shared 
by many, if not most, international legal scholars.173 For them, any attempt 
171. See generally Michael Carr, Chinese Dragon Names, in 13(2) LINGUISTICS OF THE TIBETO-
BURMAN AREA 87 (1990).
172. Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and International 
Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1072, 1129–30 (2006) (citations omitted) (“Despite its relative 
importance in the conduct of international affairs, there are few treaties that deal with it directly.  
Academic literature typically omits the subject entirely, or includes a paragraph or two defining 
espionage and describing the unhappy fate of captured spies.  For the most part, only special regimes 
such as the laws of war address intelligence explicitly.  Beyond this, it looms large but almost silently 
in the legal regimes dealing with diplomatic protection and arms control.”); see also Daniel B. Silver, 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 935, 965 (John Norton Moore & 
Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005).  Silver shares a similar view to Chesterman’s: “There is something 
almost oxymoronic about addressing the legality of espionage under international law . . . . [D]espite the 
ambiguous state of espionage under international law, it is not specifically prohibited by treaty or other 
international legal mechanism.”  Id.
173. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stranger ed., 
1962) (“[T]raditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice of espionage.  
Leading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines a spy 
and describes his hapless fate upon capture.”); W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence 
Collection, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433, 433–34 (Moore, Tipson, Turner eds., 1st ed. 1990) (“No 
serious proposal ever has been made within the international community to prohibit intelligence 
collection as a violation of international law because of the tacit acknowledgement by nations that it is 
important to all, and practiced by each.”); Geoffrey Dermarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 
DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996) (“International law regarding peacetime espionage is 
virtually unstated, and thus international law has been an inappropriate and inadequate reference for 
either condemnation or justification of actions involving intelligence gathering.”); Christopher D. Baker, 
Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 1091, 1091 
(2004) (“Espionage is curiously ill-defined under international law, even though all developed nations, 
as well as many lesser-developed ones, conduct spying and eavesdropping operations against their 
neighbors.”); Symposium on State Intelligence Gathering and International Law, 2007 Brochure, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, in John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and 
International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 596 (2007) (“While states may regulate intelligence 
gathering domestically, no significant treaties or conventions address the process, nor is it subject to any 
internationally recognized set of principles or standards . . . .  [T]he lacuna in international law on these 
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to extrapolate the lex lata corpus of the ILI, let alone its lex scripta, would 
inevitably prove to be a failed attempt, as there is simply nothing to 
extrapolate.174 In fact, the notion that international law is moot as to the 
question of if, when, and how intelligence is to be collected or dispersed has 
been repeated so many times that it has reached mythical proportions.175
Recently, a group of nineteen renowned international law experts concluded 
that “customary international law does not prohibit espionage per se . . . .
[T]he Experts concurred that insufficient State practice and opinion juris on 
the matter exist to so conclude.”176 This fiction forms the basis for a Lotus
world of action,177 one in which “[S]tates may spy on each other– and on 
each other’s nationals– without restriction,”178 justifying their behavior 
matters . . . suggests a clear need for focused discussion.”); Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address: State 
Intelligence Gathering and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 544 (2007) (“[M]ost lawyers 
would likely scoff at the notion that espionage activities are constrained in any meaningful way by 
international law.  Indeed most probably believe that international law’s only influence on espionage is 
that in wartime, spies caught behind the lines out of uniform can be shot.  Hardly a sophisticated or, to 
intelligence services, comforting notion.”); Martin Scheinin, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism,
A/HRC/10/3, 9 (Feb. 4, 2009) (“[N]o general norm exists in international law expressly prohibiting or 
limiting acts of intelligence gathering.”); Gary D. Brown & Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than Done: 
Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SEC’Y L. & POL’Y 115, 116 (2014) (“[T]here is a long-
standing (and cynically named) ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between nations to ignore espionage in 
international law.”).
174. Peyton Cooke, Bringing the Spies in from the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism and Intelligence 
Under the Laws of War, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 601, 609–10 (2010) (citations omitted) (“Very little 
international law addresses intelligence.  Indeed, beyond bilateral and multilateral intelligence-sharing 
treaties, which do not address intelligence methods, no in-depth treatment of intelligence exists in 
international law.  While some bodies of international law, such as the law of war or human rights law, 
can potentially provide for very substantial intelligence oversight, the international law of intelligence 
itself does not.  Intelligence-as-intelligence occupies a very murky place in international law that might 
be characterized as either legal but discouraged, or illegal but not enforced.  To the extent that 
international intelligence law exists, it does not provide an effective mechanism for intelligence 
regulation.”).
175. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law,
28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 625, 637–38 (2006) (“International law has never prohibited intelligence collection, 
in peacetime or wartime. . . .  The history of state practice reveals that the regulation of intelligence 
gathering has always been left to domestic enforcement. . . .  Calls to pursue the establishment of 
international entities or international law to regulate the intelligence-collection activities of nations-
states are counterproductive.”).
176. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 169 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) (citations omitted).
177. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7); cf. Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J Rep. 478, 480–481, ¶¶ 8–9 (July 22) (declaration by Simma, J.) (“[U]nder this 
approach, everything that is not expressly prohibited carries with it the same colour of legality: it ignores 
the possible degrees of non-prohibition, ranging from ‘tolerated’ to “permissible” to ‘desirable’ . . . the 
Court could have explored whether international law can be deliberately neutral or silent on a certain 
issue and whether it allows for the concept of toleration, something which breaks from the binary 
understanding of permission/prohibition and which allows for a range of non-prohibited options.  That 
an act might be ‘tolerated’ would not necessarily mean that it is ‘legal,’ but rather that it is ‘not illegal.’  
In this sense, I am concerned that the narrowness of the Court’s approach might constitute a weakness, 
going forward, in its ability to deal with the great shades of nuance that permeate international law.”).
178. Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291, 
301 (2015) (“Several government officials and scholars believe that the Lotus approach provides the 
best way to think about spying in international law.  For them, the idea is simply that nothing in 
international law forbids states from spying on each other; states therefore may spy on each other - and 
each other’s nationals - without restriction.  Spying is therefore unregulated in international law.”).
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through the argumentum ad hominem of “tu quoque.”179
Such a depiction of the law and practice of intelligence collection is, 
however, misleading.  A closer look at the literature would guide us to a 
different strand of legal thought, one which ventures into a more nuanced 
analysis of the existence and scope of the ILI.  Professor Forcese has, for 
example, noted that any ambivalence as to the level of ILI’s development 
should not be read as meaning that “spying exists in an international legal 
limbo,” since “many rules of international law may be engaged by spying, 
depending on the nature of that spying and its geographic location.”180  A
similar rebuttal of the “regulatory black-hole” premise was put forward by 
Professor Chesterman:
What, then– if anything– does international law have to say about 
[intelligence gathering]?  A surprising amount, though the surprise comes 
largely from the fact that the issue tends to be approached indirectly: 
intelligence is less a lacuna in the legal order than it is the elephant in the 
room181
The intelligence Elephant was certainly there during UNCLOS III 
negotiations, though, as suggested above, delegates simply refused to 
acknowledge it.  In attempting to diffuse the legal debate surrounding the 
prudency and lawfulness of reconnaissance activities within and above the 
EEZ, one must, from the outset, try to define the contours of this mysterious 
four-legged creature.  Within the limits of this Article, I wish to make only 
two observations about the beast: one looks at its inherently dual nature and 
the other relates to its constantly evolving shape, as affected by the fast pace 
of modern technological advancement.
A.  The Right to Spy, Abuse of Rights, and the Dual Nature of Intelligence
The territory of a State, its national airspace, its internal waters and 
territorial seas, are all subject to that State’s control and must be respected 
as such by all other States.182 This customary principle is closely linked in 
179. U.S DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 
IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 46 (1999), www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JND-LJY7] (“The lack of strong international legal sanctions for peacetime 
espionage may also constitute an implicit application of the international law doctrine of ‘tu quoque’
(roughly, a nation has no standing to complain about a practice in which it itself engages).”).  Some 
American commentators have in fact argued tu quoque against China, stressing that, despite its rhetoric, 
it itself had increased the number of its military incursions, including survey and surveillance activities, 
within the EEZs of its neighbors, namely Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam.  See Pedrozo, 
supra note 16, at 16–18 (“China’s position with regard to foreign military activities in the EEZ is self-
serving at best and disingenuous at worst.  As China continues to develop a blue water naval capability 
throughout the Asia-
180. Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 179, 185 (2011); see also, Parks, supra note 173, at 433 (“Intelligence collection 
as such does not violate international law.  However, some aspects of international law affect the means 
to be utilized in collection.”).
181. Chesterman, supra note 172, at 1072.
182. JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83 (1995) (“The general principle of 
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international law with the prohibition on the use of force and the doctrine 
of non-intervention, both enshrined in the United Nations Charter.183
Following a doctrinal interpretation of the law, one may conclude that: 
“intelligence gathering within the territorial confines of other states 
constitutes an unlawful intervention,”184 or to the very least an interference 
of a State’s sovereignty.185 On the other hand, intelligence gathering 
outside those territorial bounds, such as espionage conducted from the 
global commons (in the high seas, in international airspace, and in outer 
space) seems to be, on its face, not subjected to these restrictions.186 Even 
if one accepted the doctrinal approach, the unique sui generis status of the 
EEZ (as the meeting point between coastal States’ rights and high-seas 
freedoms) does not allow us to reach any meaningful conclusions and thus 
brings us back to square one.
But perhaps this doctrinal dichotomy is shortsighted, and traditional 
wisdom on the law of espionage is flawed.  Under this logic one can contend 
that we have focused too much of our attention on delimiting the legality of 
espionage on the basis of fictional jurisdictional lines,187 whereas in reality,
exclusive sovereignty over national territory is firmly established in customary international law . . . .
In particular, no State is entitled to carry out strategic observation in the national territory of another 
State without specific agreement.”).
183. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), Judgment 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 212 (June 27); U.N. Charter art. 2(1) (1945) (“The Organization is based on the principle of 
the sovereign equality of all its Members.”); art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”); art. 2(7) (“Nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”); see also United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, on the 
Principle Concerning the Duty Not to Intervene in Matters Within the Domestic Jurisdiction of any 
State, in Accordance with the Charter, A/RES/25/2625 (1970) (“No State or group of States has the 
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other State.  Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted 
threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in 
violation of international law.”).
184. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, & W. Michael Reisman, The Intelligence Function 
and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 394 (1973).
185. We might find a basis for this argument from within UNCLOS.  Indeed the drafters assumed, 
in the context of innocent passage within territorial waters that “any act aimed at collecting information 
to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State” is a priori prejudicial to peace, good 
order, and security.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 19(2)(c).  This is pertinent, as Article 19(2)(c) is the 
only article in the Convention to directly address intelligence gathering.  In fact, the original wording of 
earlier drafts of this Article were even more explicit.  Instead of the washed-up terminology of 
“collecting information,” they included reference to “any act of espionage” and to “any act aimed at 
interfering with any systems of communication of the coastal state.”  Id. art. 19(2)(k).  What is clear is 
that the drafters treated with suspicion surveillance activities in the territorial sea, further solidifying the 
notion that there is something more problematic with intelligence gathering by one State from within 
the territory or jurisdiction of another.  Cf. discussion infra Section III.B.
186. James Kraska, Putting Your Head in the Tiger’s Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial 
Waters, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 164, 173 (2015).
187. See, e.g., FABIEN LAFOUASSE, L’ESPIONAGE DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27–28 (2012).  
Lafouasse distinguishes between two categories of acts of espionage: those which “collaterally lead to 
an attack on the territorial integrity (land, sea, or air)” of the spied state, and those which do not involve 
“an intrusion into foreign territory, since they are essentially carried out using technical means from the 
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both tolerated and non-tolerated acts of espionage occur in all spaces 
(territorial and international).  We should thus attempt to go deeper into 
reconceptualizing the right to spy under international law.
As I have written elsewhere, one can identify scores of sources in 
international law to establish the existence of the Jus Ad Explorationem (the 
“Right to Spy”).  So much so, in fact, that “to claim that espionage is not a
priori permissible as a sovereign prerogative is simply inconceivable in our 
public world order” and certainly in discontent with both vast bodies of law 
and practice.188 However, the existence of a right to spy does not give a
State a blank check to engage in espionage whenever it so chooses or to 
select means for surveillance without limitations.  Quite the opposite, the 
right to spy, as I suggest, is merely a “derivative” right, a liberty right in 
Hohfeldian terms, not a right proper.189 As such, it is grounded in a limited 
set of justification and use restrictions.  Uncle Ben said it best when he told 
Spider-Man that “with great power comes great responsibility,” and so the 
power of a State to spy might be corrupted or abused if not used for the right 
purpose or if not meeting the golden standard (causing more harm than 
good).
The Doctrine of “Abuse of Rights” has its origins in canonical Roman 
law which recognized the legal maxim “neminem laedit qui suo jure utitur,
meaning that nobody harms another when he exercises his rights.”190 The 
doctrine has since been recognized as a general principle of international 
law,191 and is commonly cited in the writings of publicists and in early cases 
of the PCIJ.192 Professor Kiss suggested that in inter-State relations “the 
very territory of the spying State or from international spaces, that is to say from spaces escaping the 
appropriation and territorial sovereignty of States (such as the high seas, and outer space).”  In figure 3 
in the book, Lafouasse goes even further to suggest that the first category of espionage results in 
triggering the international responsibility of the spying state, whereas the latter would not.
188. Asaf Lubin, A Principled Defence of the International Human Right to Privacy: A Response 
to Frédéric Sourgens, 42 YALE J. INT’L. L. ONLINE 1, 10–11 (“In actuality, one can identify a plethora 
of legal sources that recognize, what I have termed the jus ad explorationem, a derivative right of the 
State to peace-time intelligence gathering.  These sources include the right of states to survival,
recognized by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion (and the related collective right of self-
determination of peoples); the laws on the use of force (and their recognition of a customary right for 
anticipatory self-defense); international human rights law (and the obligation of states to respect and 
ensure the right to life, liberty, and security of all persons subject to their jurisdiction); international 
humanitarian law (and the obligation of States to develop effective intelligence systems in preparation 
for war); collective security under U.N. Law (and the obligations of States under both treaty law and 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions to participate in the maintenance of international peace 
and security including through the sharing of intelligence to counter terrorism and the proliferation of 
WMDs, and to ensure the success of sanctions regimes); international disaster response laws and 
international environmental laws (which mandate cooperation in intelligence-gathering); and 
international accountability regimes (which depend on effective factual determinations that, in some 
cases, can only be achieved through continuous monitoring)”).
189. For further analysis, see Asaf Lubin, Espionage as a Sovereign Right Under International Law
and Its Limits, 24 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N Q. 22, 24 (Feb. 2016).
190. Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2006).
191. See, e.g., BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (Crawford ed., 8th ed. 2012); 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 407–09 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
192. Fourth Report on State Responsibility by Mr. F.V. Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur, 2 Y.B. 
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concept of abuse of rights may arise in three distinct legal situations.”193
For the purposes of this Article, I only wish to focus on two of these three 
situations.
The first concerns situations where Country A exercises its right 
intentionally “for an end which is different from that for which the right has 
been created, with the result that injury is caused.”194 This situation echoes 
the well-established concept of détournement de pouvoir (misuse of 
powers) in administrative law.  Of course a difficulty arises in proving 
“intention.”  As noted by G.D.S. Taylor:
[The fact] that a person is tempted to act in bad faith or otherwise abuse 
his rights does not invalidate the action taken.  The action is invalid only 
if the abuse was integral to the action taken and led to it in some way.  
The reasons for the action must be bad . . . .  The necessary first step is 
to ascertain the decision-maker’s reasons.  He may actually state them, 
or, alternatively, his failure to state them may be an abuse of right . . . .
[W]here the reasons are not stated they must be inferred from the 
surrounding facts.195
The PCIJ had further clarified in Certain German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia that any abuse of rights “cannot be presumed, and it rests with 
the party who states that there has been such misuse to prove its 
statement.”196 Regardless of evidentiary difficulties, the situation 
introduces a basic necessity requirement whereby a country may only 
exercise its right to achieve a set of distinct aims and is banned from 
exercising it for unnecessary purposes, that is, purposes not recognized by 
the international community when formulating the very right.
The second situation concerns cases where Country A exercises a right 
in such a way that hinders Country B’s ability to enjoy its own rights and, 
as a consequence, Country B suffers an injury.  As an example, Kiss notes 
the “inconsiderate use of . . . the radio-electronic spectrum,” whereby one 
of the two states sharing the spectrum will feel a reduction in their 
Int’l L. Comm’n 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/119 (1959), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_119.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X8D-S479] (ILC 
Special Rapporteur Garcia-Amador noted that “both in the writings of publicists and in diplomatic and 
legal practice it has been recognized that international responsibility may also be incurred if a State 
causes injury through the ‘abusive’ exercise of a right; that is to say if it ignores the limitations to which 
State competence is necessarily subject and which are not always formulated in exactly defined and 
specific international obligations.”) [hereinafter Garcia’s Report].
193. Kiss, supra note 190, at 5.  The third situation not addressed in this Article is that the arbitrary 
exercise of its rights by a State, causing injury to other States but without clearly violating their rights, 
can also amount to an abuse of right.  Id.
194. Id.; see also Garcia’s Report, supra note 192, at 8 (citing R. L. Bindschedler, La Protection 
de la Propriete Privee en Droit International Prive, in 90 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DE 
CROIT INTERNATIONAL 212–13 (1958)) (“It is not difficult to understand why it was recently said that 
the ‘arbitrary exercise of State competences and the use of juridical institutions for purposes alien to 
them are in fact abuse of rights.’”) (emphasis added).
195. G.D.S. Taylor, The Content of the Rule of Against Abuse of Rights in International Law, 46 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 331–32 (1972).
196. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 7, at 30 (May 25).
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enjoyment of the resource because of the behavior of the other State.197 In 
those situations, Kiss concludes, a “balance of interests” test should be 
introduced in such a way that abuses will only be found in cases “when the 
injury suffered by the aggrieved States exceeds the benefit resulting for 
another State from the enjoyment of its own right.”198 This is in essence a 
proportionality test.
Whenever abuse of rights is discussed, Lauterpacht’s sobering words 
about the delicacy in its application often follows:
These are but modest beginnings of a doctrine which is full of 
potentialities and which places a considerable power, not devoid of a 
legislative character, in the hands of a judicial tribunal.  There is no legal 
right, however well established, which could not, in some circumstances, 
be refused recognition on the ground that it has been abused.  The 
doctrine of abuse of rights is therefore an instrument which . . . must be 
wielded with studied restraint.199
These words are of course true, but as alluded the doctrine should be 
most used in cases where it “represents a plea for legislation or the 
modification of rules to suit special circumstances.”200 Indeed, abuse of 
rights is a classic general principle in the sense that its primary function is 
to fill gaps and lacunas in the law and push forward the rule-making 
processes in our international system.  Given that the law on espionage is 
one that is covered in a myriad of legal gaps, and that it is unlikely that a 
rule-based system can emerge organically through the drafting of a treaty 
or the evolution of custom, this field of inter-State activity becomes most 
ripe for filling through the use of general principles.
Applying the abuse of rights doctrine to the question of spying, it 
becomes clear that States may not utilize their right to spy for purposes other 
than advancing their national security and/or the peace and security of the 
international system as a whole.  Utilizing one’s surveillance arm for other 
purposes would fall squarely outside the derivative Hohfeldian limits 
ascribed to the right and would therefore result in an abuse.  In recognizing 
the right to spy, the international community inexplicitly created a caveat to 
Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.  Countries were willing to 
accept as tolerable injuries and assaults on territorial sovereignty, political 
independence, and the jurisdiction to determine domestic affairs, in the 
name of maintaining the important functions of intelligence in our public 
world order.  So long as the surveillance serves the raison d’être of our 
public international system, the fundamental goals of all law: “the 
minimization of violence, the maintenance of minimum order, and as 
197. Kiss, supra note 190, at 5.
198. Id.
199. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 164 (1958).
200. CRAWFORD, supra note 191, at 562.
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approximate an achievement of the policies of human dignity as each 
situation allows,”201 the activity will be the stomached by the rest of the 
community.  However, such interferences will no longer be tolerable if the 
state is abusing its right by either engaging in unnecessary or 
disproportionate surveillance activities.  This puts into greater context 
Scott’s notion that the ILI includes a set of “unexpressed but generally 
accepted norms and expectations.”202
Finally, to return full circle, an act of maritime reconnaissance and 
surveillance would be seen as serving “peaceful purposes” and therefore 
constituting an “international lawful use” to the extent that the surveilling 
party is not abusing its right to spy by acting in an unnecessary or 
disproportionate manner.  Intelligence gathering, however, can on occasion 
run in contrast with the international system’s raison d’être.  Like Orthrus, 
the two-headed dog of Geryon from Greek mythology, so is intelligence a 
unique dicephalic creature, each of its heads pushing in dyadic opposition.  
Political scientist Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt remarked upon this 
phenomenon: “Intelligence is concerned with that component of the 
struggle among nations that deals with information.  As such, it has a dual 
nature, one part governed by the fact that it deals with information, the other 
part by the fact that it is part of the conflict among nations . . . .”203
In his first State of the Union Address, President George Washington 
said that: “[t]o be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of 
preserving peace.”204  Indeed, “[t]he key to the contemporary global 
security system is a reliable and unremitting flow of intelligence to the 
pinnacle elites.”205 When policy makers are provided with sufficiently 
accurate information as to the levels and types of threats posed by their 
adversaries, their intentions, and capabilities, they are more likely to 
201. W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 83 (2003); see also W. M. REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT
442–45 (2012).  Reisman defines the principle of minimum order as the “sine qua non for all other 
goals” in our legal system.  Id. at 442.  On the basis of this principle we may appraise “past and 
prospective arrangements and prospective decisions concerning security, not in terms of the interests of 
a single participant or group of participants but in terms of everyone’s security.”  Id. at 443 (emphasis 
in original).  Minimum order entails both “a low expectation of violence” as well as the “avoidance of 
surplus violence.”  Id. at 442, 445 (emphasis in original).
202. Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. 
L. REV. 217, 226 (1999) (“As long as unexpressed but generally accepted norms and expectations 
associated with espionage are observed, international law tolerates the collection of intelligence . . . .”).
203. ABRAM N. SHULSKY & GARY J. SCHMITT, SILENT WARFARE: UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD 
OF INTELLIGENCE 177 (1991) (emphasis added).  Differently put by Professor Der Derian: “The same 
satellite that monitors and helps us verify whether the Soviets are conforming to the INF treaty, 
simultaneously maps the way for low-level, terrain-following cruise missiles.”  James Der Derian, Anti-
Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance, in ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? 43 (Wesley 
K. Wark ed., 1994).
204. President George Washington, First Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 
1790).
205. McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, supra note 184, at 434.
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calibrate their responses properly, and are less likely to rely on force as a 
means for guarding against startling attacks or strategic surprises.206
Intelligence gathering in this context serves a stability-enhancing function 
in public world order, by increasing the potential for pacific settlement of 
disputes and reducing the chances for violence.207 We have seen this 
function of intelligence play out in the context of the EEZ many times.  
Within the zone, “there are many intelligence gathering activities that are 
part of arms control verification agreements and serve a critical role in 
confidence building and thus peacekeeping.”208 Similarly, even if some of 
the surveillance operations are used to gain advantage over other States, 
those activities could still be viewed as a “force for peace because it acts as 
a deterrent.”209  Furthermore, Lt. Col. Andrew Williams of the U.S. Navy 
has contended that “[t]hrough aerial reconnaissance, the international 
community may refine its strategic assessment of a country and acquire a 
better understanding of the threat it may pose.  The collection of intelligence 
can protect against surprise attack and reduce tension.”210
Espionage is itself, however, is a kind of act of betrayal, and is thus a 
“double-edged sword.”211 While the collection of intelligence may help 
206. James E. Baker, former Chief Judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, summarized Professor Reisman’s work in the field of intelligence:
Three goals of intelligence are emphasized.  The first goal is for intelligence to inform 
decision, which improves decision. . . .
The second goal is for intelligence to offer a source of stability in maintaining international 
public order.  A state that collects intelligence regarding intent and capacity may be less likely 
to misread or misapprehend the ambiguous conduct of a potential adversary. . . .
The third goal is for intelligence to serve the interests of stability and security by offering a 
means to prevent surprise.
James E. Baker, Prelude to Decision: Michael Reisman, the Intelligence Function, and a Scholar’s Study 
of Intelligence in Law, Process, and Values, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 76 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011).
207. Michael Herman, Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001, in 2 ETHICS OF SPYING: A
READER FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL 106 (Jan Goldman ed., 2010) (“[G]overnments drawing 
on a professional standard of intelligence knowledge tended to behave as more responsible members of 
international society than those that had to manage without it, or chose to do so . . . .  This was a general 
effect, though specific cases could also be adduced in which intelligence had been deliberately used to 
underpin specific stability-producing conflict reduction arrangements, as in arms control or some of the 
U.S. mediation efforts . . . .”).
208. Summary of the Bali Dialogue, supra note 16, at 17.
209. Id.
210. Williams, supra note 52, at 59–60 (citations omitted) (“Information about the coastal state 
collected from the EEZ can apprise neighbors and interested states about the coastal state’s ambitions 
or potential to threaten the region or beyond.  Additionally, the UN Security Council, which is 
responsible for maintaining international peace and security, does not have its own intelligence service.  
It depends on information it receives from UN member states.  Yet new threats to international peace 
and security continue to arise, including from a number of coastal states, especially states that are 
secretive and closed.  Recent examples of coastal states with programs that pose grave concern to other 
states include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  North Korea 
recently conducted a second nuclear test in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.  This test came 
shortly after North Korea launched from within its territory a long-range rocket, also in defiance of UN 
Security Council resolutions.  Additionally, the Islamic Republic of Iran is reportedly developing a 
nuclear weapons program and is itself the subject of several UN Security Council resolutions.  Without 
reliable information, the UN Security Council cannot reach agreement on appropriate and effective 
collective action to respond to threats.”).
211. Tony Pfaff, Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern 
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defuse conflicts over the long haul, its immediate effect is the signaling of 
“distrust and suspicion,” which “rather than fostering peace and security, 
fosters instability and conflict.”212 This is particularly true when the 
collection efforts are conducted in ways that are perceived as illegitimate, 
either because of their basis of justification or choice of means.  In these 
scenarios, intelligence agencies would seem to be employed not in the name 
of a Washingtonian “preservation of peace,” but rather in the service of the 
“continuation of war by the clandestine interference of one power into the 
affairs of another power.”213
Stuck between these two heads of the intelligence Orthrus, it would 
seem that we are presented with a broad spectrum of potential activities that 
would have to be examined on a contextual basis (one which considers the 
particular circumstances of each surveillance operation, its goals, and the 
means employed).214 The issue is therefore not with the maritime zone 
from within which the spying takes place, but rather the specific facts 
surrounding each spying operation.  This has surely been the position of 
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, who have argued that the “gathering of 
intelligence within territorial confines of another state is not, in and of itself, 
contrary to international law unless it contravenes policies of the world 
constitutive process.”215 What is therefore missing from the literature is a 
precise and careful drawing of the broader ILI lines (as opposed to the EEZ 
lines) so as to define the boundaries of accepted behavior. Intelligence 
gathering “ranges widely from forcible to non-forcible interventions; from 
purely analytical to violently ‘wet work;’ and from overtly persuasive to 
covertly manipulative forms of influence.”216
In the context of surveillance within the EEZ, a growing number of 
commentators have predicted an increase in violence and political tension 
as a result of the rise of electronic and cyber warfare capabilities:217
[I]ntelligence gathering activities in EEZs are most likely going to 
become more controversial and more dangerous.  In Asia, this disturbing 
prospect reflects the increasing and changing demands for technical 
intelligence; the robust weapons acquisition programs, especially 
increasing electronic warfare (EW) capabilities; and the widespread 
development of information warfare capabilities.  Further, the scale and 
scope of maritime and airborne intelligence collection activities are likely 
Age, in 1 ETHICS OF SPYING: A READER FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL 66, 76 (Jan Goldman 
ed., 2006).
212. Id.; see also GLENN HASTEDT, ESPIONAGE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 48 (2003) (“The 
starting point for overcoming uncertainty and increasing the predictability of the actions of other states
is the acquisition of information about them.  Espionage is a means of doing so, but given the deceit and 
potentially treasonous nature of the act, it is also one surrounded by ambivalence.”).
213. JAMES DER DERIAN, ANTIDIPLOMACY: SPIES, TERROR, SPEED AND WAR 21 (1992).
214. Id.
215. McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, supra note 184, at 395.
216. DERIAN, supra note 213, at 21.
217. See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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to expand rapidly over the next decade, involving levels and sorts of 
activities quite unprecedented in peacetime.  They will not only become 
more intensive; they will generally be more intrusive.  They will generate 
tensions and more frequent crises; they will produce defensive reactions 
and escalatory dynamics; and they will lead to less stability in the most 
affected regions, especially in Asia.218
Another commentator had suggested that the threat is most worrisome 
in the East-China Sea, further noting that:
The frequent visit by foreign naval survey vessels and routine flight of 
military intelligence planes over the EEZs of the coastal States in the 
region certainly represents a major source of tension and instability.  
There is all the likelihood for them to cause surface and air traffic control 
problems, and increase the chances of accidents, if not conflicts.  
Countries subject to these intrusive navigation and over-flight off their 
coastal waters are likely if not inevitably to take counter-measures to 
safeguard their maritime jurisdiction and interests.219
These considerations must be borne in mind as we develop a forward-
looking, minimum-order-based, set of tests that would help determine the 
limits of the right to spy.  The standards introduced in Section IV aim to do 
just that, as their goal is to serve a useful compass to determine what would 
a priori constitute serving “peaceful purposes” and what would prima facie 
constitute a potential abuse of rights.
B.  On Surveillance Capabilities, Technological Advancements, and the 
Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties
The dichotomy between law and technology has long been tenuous in 
the best of times, and irreconcilable at the worst.  Answering to different 
masters, technological development and legal structures are in a constant 
state of ebb and flow, with each pushing the contours of the other in 
choreographed exchange of concessions and compromises.220
One way that has been proposed to secure a permanent dance floor on 
which law and technology could share their “choreographed exchange” is 
through the evolutionary interoperation of treaties.  The ICJ had recently 
addressed the issue in dicta in its Navigational and Related Rights (Costa 
Rica v. Nicaragua) judgment:
[T]here are situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the 
treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the terms used– or 
some of them– a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed 
once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other things, 
developments in international law.  In such instances it is indeed in order 
to respect the parties’ common intention at the time the treaty was 
218. Mark J. Valencia & Kazumine Akimoto, Report of the Tokyo Meeting and Progress to Date,
29 MARINE POL’Y 101, 102–03 (2005).
219. Gao, supra note 53, at 291.
220. Timothy Coughlin, The Future of Robotic Weaponry and the Law of Armed Conflict: 
Irreconcilable Differences?, 17 UCL JURIS. REV. 67, 67–68 (2011).
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concluded, not to depart from it, that account should be taken of the 
meaning acquired by the terms in question upon each occasion on which 
the treaty is to be applied . . . where the parties have used generic terms
in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been aware that the meaning of 
the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has been 
entered into for a very long period or is “of continuing duration,” the 
parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms 
to have an evolving meaning221
This position of the Court is not new, however.  Judge Jessup had said 
in his dissenting opinion to the South West Africa Cases as early as 1966 
(and shortly after the adoption of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties) that: “The law can never be oblivious to the changes in life, 
circumstance and community standards in which it functions.  Treaties—
especially multipartite treaties of a constitutional or legislative character—
cannot have an absolutely immutable character.”222
UNCLOS, coined by some as the Constitution of the Sea, relies heavily 
on “generic terms” (some of which we have already encountered in this 
survey, such as “international lawful use,” “peaceful purposes,” “due 
regard,” “marine scientific research,” and “equity”).  Given the significant 
political and technological advancements that have occurred since the 
formulation of the treaty, there is room to argue in favor of a reading of 
these terms that is influenced by these dramatic tectonic shifts.223 What an 
“international lawful use” might have meant under a Cold War mentality in 
1982 could mean something utterly different in 2018, in a multi-polarized 
international political system with increased types and levels of threats and 
broader needs for securitization.224 Current inadequacies within the EEZ 
regime, therefore, could be corrected through a process of interpretative 
221. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 
I.C.J. 213, 242–43 (Jul. 13) (emphasis added); see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 
Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Dec. 19).
222. South West Africa Case (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Jessup, ICJ Rep 1966, 439 (Jul. 18).
223. Gao, supra note 53, at 292–93 (“All these recent developments demonstrate that the LOS 
Convention as the Charter of the world oceans, is not squarely perfect.  And they also suggest that some 
of the provisions in the Convention, formulated some [thirty-five] years ago in a very different political 
and technological context, be revisited in the light of the new circumstances such as that of the Post-
Cold War and the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks.”); see also Guifang, supra note 9, at 89 (“The advancement 
of science and technology requires adjustments in state practice regarding appropriate interpretation of 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in order to address 
current inadequacies in the international framework.”).
224. See, e.g., Wachman, supra note 20, at 117 (“During the Cold War, the cat-and-mouse, tit-for-
tat, thrust-and-parry competition with the Soviet Union was a rivalry between two more or less evenly 
matched opponents.  Applying the same norms and harboring expectations that its relations with the 
PRC ought to follow the same pattern, Washington either overlooks or revels in the asymmetry.”); 
Haiwen, supra note 93, at 39 (“[The U.S.-Soviet dealings] happened in the Cold War era and [are] the 
product of the Cold War confrontation between the two superpowers at that time.  As we all know, the 
present relationship between China and the United States is obviously not one between Cold War 
opponents or one of any confro
to building active cooperation in the twenty-
common challenges to establish a steady partnership.”).
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reevaluation of these terms under UNCLOS.225
We have already witnessed one example of this evolutionary 
interoperation in the context of Chinese prohibitionist positions with 
regards to MSR.226 Scholars had argued that the introduction of the GPS 
has completely redefined hydrographic surveying, justifying a need for a 
reexamination of the meaning of MSR under UNCLOS.227 However, 
another provision of UNCLOS that is perhaps ripe for an evolutionary 
interpretation is Article 19(2)(c), which concerns innocent passage in the 
territorial sea.  The provision is important because it is the only one in the 
treaty to speak in some fashion about espionage.  In fact, it is the only treaty 
provision globally which uses negative language in speaking explicitly 
about the practice of espionage.  Under UNCLOS, ships of all States enjoy 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.228 Article 19 
establishes “passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State.”  The Article proceeds by 
establishing a set of circumstances that prima facie are to be considered as 
prejudicial to peace, good order or security; one of them is Article 19(2)(c),
which speaks of “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of 
the defence or security of the coastal state.”
Since the drafting of UNCLOS, surveillance technology has evolved 
significantly.  Reconnaissance activities now conducted in the EEZ are 
comparable to those that used to be conducted in the territorial sea and for 
which legal presumptions and protections were found necessary by the 
drafters of UNCLOS.  It begs the question: why should legal protections not 
be granted in the EEZ against the same exact intelligence activities which 
the drafters found useful to deem prima facie prejudicial to peace, order, 
and security under Article 19(2)(c)?229 This question is further heightened 
when one compares the types and volumes of threats that exist today in the 
sphere of marine security with what existed at the time when UNCLOS was 
drafted.  The rising securitization of the oceans is a knee-jerk reaction to 
this rise in threats and their sophistication.  While not all aspects of this 
phenomenon should be condoned, some of its root causes and logic should 
nonetheless be acknowledged.
225. KLEIN, supra note 40, at 221 (“The current legal position appears to support the legality of 
intelligence gathering by third states in the EEZ.  Is this desirable, though? A change may be warranted 
in light of the international tension created through intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ, most 
clearly evidenced in the encounters between China and the United States, and the increasing 
securitization of the EEZ . . . .  Modern means of warfare, especially the use of information warfare and 
electronic warfare, support an argument that the position should shift to prevent intelligence gathering 
in another State’s EEZ.”).
226. See supra Section II.B.1.a
227. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
228. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 17.
229. KLEIN, supra note 40, at 220; see also Ren Ziafeng & Cheng Xizhong, A Chinese Perspective,
29 MARINE POL’Y 139, 143–45 (2005).
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At the same time, even if we recognize Article 19(2)(c)’s place in the 
broader law of the sea regime, and even if we extend its logic to the EEZ 
through a form of evolutionary interpretation, we must nonetheless apply it 
through the lenses of the lex specialis of the ILI.  We should determine 
which practices of surveillance should be tolerated in accordance with the 
standards on the right to spy as above illustrated.
McDougal, Lasswell, and Miller had argued in 1967 that treaty 
interpretation must give due effect to “basic constitutive policies of the 
larger community,” to the “requirements of fundamental community 
policy,” and to “the goals of public order.”230 This reference to community 
values and minimum order in treaty interpretation seems to echo Judge 
Jessup’s position in the South West Africa case and the Court’s dicta in
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua.  In the context of UNCLOS, they would all seem 
to favor a broader review of treaty obligations, which considers, on a case-
by-case basis, the impacts that technology has had on intelligence collection 
within the zone.
***
Section III of this paper looked at both the unique nature of the right 
to spy within the ILI and the limitations imposed on that right.  Section III 
additionally examined the way in which advancements in the field of 
maritime surveillance might justify a technology-induced evolutionary 
interpretation of UNCLOS.  What is clear from both the analyses is that the 
use of certain surveillance capabilities, for certain purposes, in certain 
fashion, from within or above the EEZ might indeed erode and subvert the 
international equilibrium that has been struck within the ILI in relation to 
UNCLOS.  Section IV thus introduces three possible limitations on 
intelligence collection, as an attempt to respond to the modern demands 
discussed above.
IV. TAMING THE DRAGON-KINGS WITH LEGAL HOOPS
Scholarly proposals for the rebalancing of rights and obligations 
amongst maritime and coastal States are not new.  Professor Potter had 
suggested as early as 1927 that:
[L]itoral states may act in certain ways for the preservation of their safety 
and the protection of their laws over an undefined and indefinite stretch 
of coastal waters . . . .  Real danger to the littoral state or its laws, and 
actual infractions of those laws, are the tests of the right of the state to 
act, rather than the scene of that action.231
230. MYRES MCDOUGAL, HAROLD LASSWELL, & JAMES MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 41–44 (1967).
231. PITMAN B. POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN HISTORY, LAW AND POLITICS 103–04 
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Professor Lissitzyn was the first to propose, as early as 1970 and long 
before the codification of the EEZ regime, the setting of certain limitations 
on States’ reconnaissance operations on the high seas (even within the 
global commons):232
Although international law does not forbid electronic reconnaissance 
from the high seas and does not empower the coastal state to interfere 
with foreign warships and aircraft engaged in it, such reconnaissance is 
likely to be resented by coastal states and to heighten international 
tensions.  It should be resorted to, therefore, only if careful study indicates 
that its costs are substantially outweighed by its benefits to the state that 
engages in it.233
Lissitzyn’s proposal for a cost-benefit study to be taken by States prior 
to their unilateral initiation of maritime electronic reconnaissance 
operations is a fascinating one, not only for its intuitive clairvoyance.  First, 
Lissitzyn makes clear that this proposal falls outside the ambit of the law-
in-existence, the lex lata.  Nonetheless, he puts forward his proposal as a 
matter of lex ferenda, or future-law.  The proposal is introduced as a 
suggested operative guideline to be internalized by States, arguably, as a 
first step towards broader regulation.
Furthermore, Lisstizyn is grounding this legal move on the basis of 
minimum order justifications (noting that the existing conscripted structure 
is only likely to “heighten international tensions”).  This is intriguing, given 
the fact that Lissitzyn is applying his proposed model to the high seas at a 
time where flag States possessed only limited technological capacities in 
the field of maritime reconnaissance.  Just imagine if Lissitzyn were to live 
in our times.  Surely, upon examination of the EEZ surveillance problem, 
he would welcome the application of a similar, if not higher, standard within 
the zone, where (unlike the high seas) coastal States enjoy at least partial 
sovereign territorial rights, and are increasingly exposed to more intrusive 
potential surveillance capabilities as well as maritime threats.  Moreover, 
Lisstizyn’s approach follows a similar thinking to the one that I put forward 
whereby we base our analysis of tolerated acts of espionage not on the basis 
of their specific location, but on a contextual analysis of the reasons for 
spying and the means employed.
Finally, the proposal is unique as it suggests a cost-benefit study for 
determining the prudence of a particular electronic reconnaissance 
operation, thus echoing the language of necessity and proportionality as 
above discussed.
(1924).
232. Lissitzyn, supra note 91, at 569 (“Although international law does not forbid electronic 
reconnaissance from the high seas and does not empower the coastal state to interfere with foreign 
warships and aircraft engaged in it, such reconnaissance is likely to be resented by coastal states and to 
heighten international tensions.  It should be resorted to, therefore, only if careful study indicates that 
its costs are substantially outweighed by its benefits to the state that engages in it.”).
233. Id.
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Post-UNCLOS scholars and research institutes have too suggested 
certain limitations and mechanisms for governing intelligence collection 
within the zone.  In this context one should note Oxman (1984),234 and to a 
greater extent Beckman and Davenport (2012), who had suggested 
separately a “due regard” model as a limit to certain military and 
reconnaissance activities within the zone, and as a potential obligation setter 
for flag States to negotiate and notify prior to launching a unilateral 
surveillance activity.235 Other proposals include Kaye’s (2005) 
examination of the subjective intentions of flag States in determining the 
lawfulness of their intelligence activity236 and Hayashi’s (2005) reference 
to a reasonableness standard as a possible limitation.237
The most robust guidelines so far suggested are those put forward by 
EEZ Group 21, an initiative of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in 
Japan, which included senior officials, legal experts, and maritime 
specialists.  The guidelines set clear definitions to UNCLOS terms that were 
previously left undefined (namely “peaceful uses/purpose,” “military 
surveys,” “military activities,” “marine scientific research,” and 
“hydrographic survey”).  Furthermore, the guidelines introduce two very 
pertinent limitations on intelligence gathering by third States within and 
above the zone.  First, in Article V.b., the group suggests that:
“Ships and aircrafts of a State undertaking military activities in the EEZ 
of another State have the obligation to use the ocean for peaceful 
purposes only, and to refrain from the threat or use of force, or 
234. Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 878 (1984) (“It is essentially futile exercise to engage in speculation 
as to whether naval maneuvers and exercises within the economic zone are permissible.  In principle 
they are.  States simply never agreed to abandon such rights in all the semi-enclosed seas of the world, 
including all those bordering Europe and Arabia, for example.  The relevant inquiry is whether the 
particular activity in a particular place is consistent with the ‘due regard’ obligation.  For example, it 
would be difficult to justify weapons exercise that does significant damage to a valuable natural resource 
being exploited by the coastal State in the economic zone. On the other hand, a coastal State’s political 
or military interest in avoiding the presence of the warship is not in itself reflected in its economic zone 
rights under article 56, and accordingly is not an object of the ‘due regard’ obligation of the flag State.”).
235. Beckman & Davenport, supra note 13, at 23–24, 29 (“The first course of action would be a 
good faith observance (required by Article 300) of the mutual obligations of ‘due regard’ in the EEZ.  
From a practical perspective, this should involve procedural steps of consultation, notification and co-
operation to minimize interference with each other’s legitimate rights in the EEZ . . . . Implementation 
of the ‘due regard’ obligation through notification or consultation . . . may not be a feasible solution 
particularly when it comes to intelligence-gathering survey activities.  One way to deal with this issue 
is for the surveying State to assure the coastal State that the information being gathered is only for 
military purposes and that the information will not be made available to the public.”).
236. Kaye, supra note 7, at 100–02 (“If the case for freedom to undertake military surveillance in 
another State’s EEZ can be made, it is clearly subject to some qualification . . . .  One issue that could 
be relevant in assessing the legality of military surveillance from the EEZ, or high seas, relates to 
whether such surveillance might constitute a threat to international peace and security . . . routine 
intelligence-gathering flights or voyages through another state’s EEZ would not of themselves be illegal, 
unless they formed a prelude to an unauthorised attack on another state.”).
237. Hayashi, supra note 8, at 129 (“It must be concluded from the foregoing that State practice and 
commentators are divided on whether military maneuvers, and particularly those involving use of 
weapons, in the EEZ of a foreign State without its consent are internationally lawful uses of the sea . . . .
Commentators tend to argue that naval exercises of reasonable scale without the use of weapons are 
permitted.”).
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provocative acts, such as stimulating or exciting the defensive systems of 
the coastal State; collecting information to support the use of force 
against the coastal State . . . .”238
Furthermore, in Article VI.a., it is suggested that: “The activities of 
another State in the EEZ of a coastal State should not interfere with the 
communications, computer, and electronic systems of the coastal State, or 
make broadcasts that adversely affect the defense or security of the coastal 
State.”239 While there is no indication that any State has adopted these 
guidelines, they nonetheless offer an interesting alternative comprehensive 
resolution for the EEZ debate.
More broadly, it is the author’s contention that there exists a 
connecting thread between all of the scholarly proposals suggested above.  
They all seem to echo certain aspects of necessity and proportionality and 
would also correlate with the author’s description of the right to spy and the 
ways by which it might be abused.  Necessity, Last Resort, and 
Proportionality are a set of legal “yardsticks”240 developed over time 
through customary evolution to constrain the lawful behavior of intrastate 
engagement.241 For example, while the U.N. security system allows for the 
unilateral use of force by States to tackle unlawful force mounted against 
them, international law puts in place jus ad bellum limitations to ensure that 
no abuse occurs in the exercise of this right.242 This is done to manage the 
potential pitfalls of codifying a lawful recourse to self-help by States.
Unilateral intelligence gathering is not thematically different from 
unilateral uses of force, and in many ways it is also a reflection of a primitive 
system structured around self-help.  If we wish to recognize unilateral 
intelligence activities by States as lawful (or at the very least tolerable), 
because we contend that they serve the function of maintaining both 
national security and international peace and stability, we must also accept 
certain limitations so to prevent potential misuse and abuse of this right.  
We need to ensure that Dr. Jekyll does not turn into Mr. Hyde.  This Section 
is interested in identifying what such limitations might look like in the 
context of intelligence gathering within and above the EEZ, while applying 
them to actual recent cases.
238. Sam Bateman, Prospective Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, 144 MAR. STUDS. 17 Annex B (2005) (emphasis added).
239. Id.
240. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 231 (5th ed., 2012).
241. See generally NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 43 (2010); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. ¶ 4 (Jul. 8), (recognizing necessity and proportionality rules of customary international law).
242. DINSTEIN, supra note 240, at 187 (“[T]he essence of self-defense is self-help: under certain 
conditions set by international law, a State acting unilaterally – perhaps in association with other 
countries – may respond with lawful force to unlawful force (or, according to some, to the imminent 
threat of unlawful force).  The reliance on self-help as a remedy available to States when their rights are 
violated, is and always has been one of the hallmarks of international law. Self-help is a characteristic 
feature of all primitive legal systems, but in international law it has been honed to art form.”).
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A.  Necessity and Just Cause
As discussed above, the legal (not to say moral)243 justification for the 
practice of surveillance is that such practice must serve the justifications 
that stand at the heart of the right to engage in espionage in the first place.  
Borrowing from Just War doctrine, intelligence operations within and above 
the zone must entertain a “just cause.”  As further suggested by Professor 
Genderon:
Just Cause with respect to the use of intelligence requires that the need to 
know . . . [be] deemed necessary to identify, clarify, prevent, or counter 
real and certain threats to ensure national security.  The claim must be 
real and not spurious, and capable of being demonstrated as such within 
oversight procedures.244
A submarine spying on a coastal State to determine whether it 
conducted an otherwise non-acknowledged nuclear test, or a marine vessel 
engaging in a reconnaissance mission off the shores of a particular foe to 
map out missile sites, would surely meet the necessity requirement.  Put 
differently, operations would be deemed necessary if they serve either the 
national security interests of the State or the minimum order goals of our 
public world order (the minimization of violence and the increase of 
stability across the system).
On the other hand, applying Genderon’s approach to the EEZ issue 
would seem to entail that surveillance operations which are employed as a 
coercive political tool would not be deemed necessary.  Consider, for 
example, the U.S. FONOP program.  The program involves the sending of 
warships and surveillance vessels into both the 200 nautical-mile EEZ and 
the twelve nautical-mile territorial seas of coastal States.  The FONOP 
program, which has been ongoing since the late ’70s and early ’80s, is 
designed “to challenge maritime claims that the U.S. finds inconsistent with 
international law.  These operations ‘involve naval units transiting disputed 
areas to avoid setting the precedent that the international community has 
accepted these unlawful claims.’”245 In other words, the United States is 
243. See Pfaff, supra note 211, at 98 (“[T]he moral justification for the practices of the intelligence 
profession, particularly where such practices involve committing acts that would be immoral outside the 
professional context, is that such acts must aim at promoting national security, not simply national 
interests, and especially not simply the interests of some nationals.”).
244. Angela Gendron, Just War, Just Intelligence: An Ethical Framework for Foreign Espionage,
18(3) INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 398, 417–18 (2005)
245. Testimony of the Director of South Asia Programs, supra note 156, at 3; see also O’ROURKE,
supra note 18, at 28; Julian Ku, Dear World Media: The U.S. is NOT Challenging China’s Territorial 
Claims in the South China Sea (Yet), OPINIO JURIS (May 27, 2015), 
www.opiniojuris.org/2015/05/27/dear-world-media-the-u-s-is-not-challenging-chinas-territorial-
claims-in-the-south-china-sea-yet/ [https://perma.cc/WX8D-2THN]; LYNN KUOK, THE U.S. FON
PROGRAM IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A LAWFUL AND NECESSARY RESPONSE TO CHINA’S STRATEGIC 
AMBIGUITY (2016) (“Under UNCLOS, ‘freedom of navigation’ refers (only) to navigation rights user 
states enjoy in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and high seas, subject to the obligation to pay ‘due 
regard’ to the rights and duties of the coastal states and to comply with the laws and regulations adopted 
by the coastal state in accordance with UNCLOS . . . .  In addition, the FON Program also guards against 
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employing parts of its naval reconnaissance arm, not to collect necessary 
intelligence against an adversary, but rather as a new form of rattle-
diplomacy and lawfare,246 which only increases tension and decreases 
cooperation.  At the heart of the FONOP program stands the desire to 
“demonstrate a non-acquiescence to excessive maritime claims,”247 and it 
is further rooted in the fear that “a minority position could gather enough 
momentum to bring about establishment of a new law of the sea norm or 
‘paradigm shift’” (with the legal basis for this concern being Article 
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which considers 
subsequent practice in the application of treaties during treaty 
interoperation).248
International law provides States with numerous alternative avenues 
and forums to make their legal positions heard and prevent their 
acquiescence to certain claims by other States.  Reliance on stability-
thwarting self-help operations solely for the purpose of making a legal point 
against the PRC would run counter to the purposes for which the right to 
spy was intended.  Moreover, and this is the key point, even under the 
author’s proposal, the U.S. should be able to continue to engage in 
surveillance operations in the South China Sea when those operations meet 
standards of necessity and proportionality.  Those operations could in and 
of themselves serve the purpose of non-acquiescence which the United 
States is headstrong in achieving.  Nonetheless, the volume of the operations 
will decrease to what the United States identifies as important, and thus 
stability will increase as a result.249
On the other side, consider China’s surveillance operations across the 
South China Sea.  The Annex VII Tribunal in the South China Sea 
Arbitration found in its 2016 award a violation of the law of the sea by 
China’s utilizing of its surveillance vessels for the purposes of advancing 
its “creeping jurisdiction.”250 Another example could be China’s 
claims inconsistent with the legal divisions of the ocean and related airspace reflected in UNCLOS since 
excessive maritime claims in these respects will reduce navigation and overflight rights.”).
246. MAJ Chuah Meng Soon, supra note 97 (making the case for FON operations and concluding 
by saying that “lawfare will continue in the debate of UNCLOS between maritime powers and coastal 
states”).
247. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., “Freedom of Navigation Program: Fact Sheet”, 1 (March 2015),
http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/DoD%20FON%20Program%20--
%20Fact%20Sheet%20(March%202015).pdf [https://perma.cc/4F7H-YLRR].
248. KUOK, supra note 245, at 4.
249. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 80, at 287 (“These factors suggest that a move to placate Chinese 
concerns could reap major dividends for both regional and global security.  From Washington’s 
perspective, the legal principle that military activities are permissible within EEZs simply cannot be 
negotiable.  However, standing firm on the principle does not preclude significant reductions in these 
activities, which hold the potential to seriously improve the security relationship.”).
250. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award,  at ¶ 757(Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2016), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086 [https://perma.cc/SA6U-ZRV9].  The 
Tribunal argued that the decision by China to send maritime vessels into the Philippines’ EEZ for the 
purpose of escorting fishing vessels which were deemed to be fishing illegally in those waters constituted 
a violation of the law of the sea.  Id. (“China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels 
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surveillance in Japan’s declared EEZ.251 Once again, it is argued that to 
rely on intelligence vessels and aircraft, not for their intended use, but rather 
as means for exerting authority or advancing legal and political interests 
through the subordination of the interests of other States, should be deemed 
an illegitimate use.  China has multiple non-coercive means to challenge 
disputed maritime delimitations.  Participating in arbitral proceedings is 
certainly one such option.  Accepting as lawful an exploitive use of the 
intelligence function would provide a disservice for the function 
intelligence plays in international relations.
Finally, intelligence gathering cannot be used as a lawful 
countermeasure.  Countermeasures are “limited by the requirements of 
humanity and the rules of good faith applicable in relations between 
States.”252 A State therefore cannot conduct surveillance operations in 
another State’s EEZ, when the purpose is only to retaliate to what it 
perceives as a previous wrong.  In this context, for Russia to rely on an aerial 
and naval “brinkmanship” policy,253 turning its reconnaissance vessels and 
aircraft into weapons in a political power-play over the Ukraine, is too 
destabilizing and illegitimate.
Professors McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman have suggested as early 
as 1973 that the “coercion level of intelligence gathering activities” should 
play a role in determining the lawfulness of the operation, but only within a 
broader contextual goal-sensitive analysis which will consider coercion 
alongside “all other facets of the case.”254 For the author, in determining 
the necessity of a particular surveillance operation, its coercive non-
defensive nature must play an important determinative role.  The above 
three examples, when read in context, and when considered in light of world 
order policy goals they are aimed to achieve, fall outside the lines of what 
is legitimately “necessary.”  They all reflect a reliance on the right to spy, 
but not for the purposes of which it was intended, and should therefore be 
branded as “abuse of rights.”  Such measures cannot be reconciled with 
UNCLOS Article 88’s requirement of “peaceful purposes,” or with broader 
international community interests as discussed in this Article.
As a final note, it should be made clear that if the intelligence operation 
crosses from a mere defensive or passive act to one with an offensive 
character (either if intelligence is collected to launch an immediate 
in tolerating and failing to exercise due diligence to prevent fishing by Chinese flagged vessels at 
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013, failed to exhibit due regard to the Philippines’ 
sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone.”).
251. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
252. Responsibility of Germany for Damage Caused in the Portuguese Colonies in the South of 
Africa (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, 1026 (1928); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-
Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 50(a)(1) (2001).
253. See Frear, Kulesa, & Kearns, supra note 150 and accompanying text.
254. McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, supra note 184, at 419.
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offensive non-Charter-authorized attack, or if the operation takes the form 
of active electronic and information warfare activity), there would be even 
more reason to claim that such operations should be deemed unlawful as 
they constitute a threat or use of force in violation of Article 2(4).
B.  Immediacy/Last Resort
Immediacy is directly tied to the principle of last resort.255 This would 
denote that a State contemplating a unilateral surveillance activity within a 
coastal State’s EEZ should need to first satisfy itself, relying on verifiable 
evidence, that no alternative means were available for it to achieve its lawful 
objectives.  As suggested by Professor Genderon:
The aim should be to limit use of the most intrusive collection means to 
those situations where, as a necessary and last resort, no alternative is 
possible, either because [alternative] sources are not available, or are 
likely to prove insufficient, unreliable, or incapable of producing what is 
required within the necessary time frame.256
In the context of maritime surveillance, applying this standard would 
entail, for example, that if the possibility exists to conduct the same 
operation, with the same results, from the high seas or outer space, such 
recourse will be mandated.
Similarly, if the option is viable to negotiate with the coastal State or 
provide some form of prior notification or reassurance, these too should be 
first exhausted.  This is particularly true when operations are conducted in 
the name of tackling regional or international threats, such as drug 
trafficking, terrorism, or piracy.  The MSR model enshrined in UNCLOS 
Article 246 should be applied here mutatis mutandis.  In other words, the 
coastal State should generally grant consent for such surveillance 
operations, so long as “normal circumstances” persist.257 In this regard,
consider the Peruvian attack on a U.S. propeller-driven C-130 aircraft on 
April 25, 1992, or the 2007 and 2009 Russian reconnaissance activities 
above the EEZs of Norway, Canada, and the U.K.  If the United States was 
indeed conducting routine counterdrug surveillance missions, and Russia 
was indeed patrolling the seas and air to protect shipping lanes, there would 
be no reason for both these maritime powers not to seek the cooperation of 
the coastal States in whose EEZs they operated, or to the very least inform 
those States prior to the launching of unilateral operations.  Not doing so 
increases suspicion and volatility and hampers both the operation’s 
immediate success and, more broadly, intelligence as an international tool 
255. Letter from Secretary of State Webster to British Minister Fox (1841), in 2 JOHN BASSETT 
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906) (“leaving no choice of means and no moment 
for deliberation”).
256. Gendron, supra note 244, at 418.
257. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
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for increasing cooperation in the long haul.
Going back to U.S. surveillance operations in the South China Sea as 
part of the FONOP program, one commentator has noted that “the United 
States could feasibly obtain the necessary surveillance data through other 
means, such as satellite reconnaissance and other less blatant intrusions.”258
This too should be taken into account in deciding if and which FONOP 
operations to launch.
C.  Proportionality
The principle of proportionality would follow the same intrinsic logic 
suggested by Professor Lissitzyn in 1970.  If the “costs are substantially 
outweighed by its benefits,” the operation should not be launched.  States 
should factor into this analysis not only their own national interests, but also
the interests of the coastal State, third States, and those of the international 
community as a whole.  Sir Quinlan further adds:
Constraint would accept that there are some methods of collection that 
must never be used, however severe we may judge the possible injury to
be, and some that must not be used disproportionately - that is in 
circumstances where the breach of normal moral rules is more severe than 
the importance of the legitimate objective reasonably warrants.259
Proportionality is a relative term that is difficult to define.  While 
considered a customary principle, “when faced with the need to implement 
it in practice its precise content becomes infamously elusive.”260
Nonetheless, as this Article has suggested, what is necessary is some form 
of a nuanced “balance of interests.” Proportionality should therefore be 
examined, in part, in accordance with the political atmosphere surrounding 
the operation;261 the aims that stand at the heart of the decision to launch 
the surveillance operation; the likelihood of success of the operation; and 
the potential risks to minimum order goals and to intrusion on coastal 
States’ rights in the exercise of the operation.  As more cases come to light, 
and as more scholars apply the proportionality principle to them, the exact 
margins would begin to show.  At the time being, one can at least raise 
questions as to the scope and intensity of U.S. surveillance operations in 
China’s EEZ, China’s surveillance operations in and around the South 
China Sea, as well as Russian operations near and above the Baltic Sea in 
recent years, and their meeting the standard of proportionality.
258. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 80, at 287.
259. Michael Quinlan, Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory, 22(1) INTELLIGENCE 
& NAT. SEC. 1, 6 (2007).
260. LUBELL, supra note 241, at 65.
261. See Williams, supra note 52, at 58 (“A coastal state could consider foreign military maneuvers 
in its EEZ a threat of force, if the maneuvers were conducted in an atmosphere of high political tension 
and accompanied by tacit or overt demands.”).
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
On a panel titled “Military Activities in the EEZ” moderated in 2009 
by the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Russian Professor of Law
Alexander Skaridov criticized what he viewed as “artificial” attempts by 
scholars to resolve the EEZ surveillance conundrum through “narrowing, as 
much as possible, the freedom of military navigation.”262 Instead, he has
contended, quite boldly, that the EEZ dispute must be:
[A]ddressed and resolved through the sometimes chaotic and unruly 
process whereby countries assert and defend their positions through state 
practices, followed by protests, by disagreeing countries, and then 
eventually by the give and take of diplomatic negotiations.  Sooner or 
later consensus will emerge through this disorderly process.  Already 
many sailors, pilots, and fishermen have died as nations assert their 
sometimes conflicting positions and jockey to put forward their views.  It
is to be hoped that violent conflicts can be kept to a minimum during the 
remainder of this law-making process.263
Professor Skaridov’s criticism reminds me of the preface to Kant’s 
“Perpetual Peace.”  Skaridov, in this case, is taking the role of the “practical 
politician,” whereas I would seem to assume the position of the political 
theorist whose “empty ideas” are detached from worldly realities.  This 
Article, however, and the ideas it puts forward are not naïve.  I carefully 
worked to evade the trap of the “Hegelian impulse,” if to use the words of 
Professor Radsan.264 It is important to remember that “[a]ll law requires 
political support.  Principles of international law, like any prescription, are 
abrogated when their consumers and custodians decide, for better or worse 
to change them.”265 All the international lawyer can do, as Reisman taught 
us, is “to participate in clarifying and formulating the common interest of 
the most comprehensive world community”266 in the hopes of assisting 
future lawmakers in accomplishing their prescriptive tasks.
For most scholars who have examined the EEZ surveillance 
conundrum, the matter is exclusively understood through the lenses of the 
age-old rivalry between Hugo Grotius and John Selden over Mare Liberum
(The Freedom of the Seas) and Mare Clausum (The Closing of the Seas),267
somewhat broadly construed.  This Article should not be deemed as 
legitimizing attempts by coastal States to expand their maritime territorial 
bounds through “creeping jurisdiction.”  Rather, the framework proposed in 
262. Skaridov, supra note 14, at 252–53.
263. Id. at 258.
264. See Radsan, supra note 173, at 596.
265. W. Michael Reisman, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
852, 860 (2006).
266. Reisman, supra note 201, at 350.
267. For broader reading on the conflicting views between Grotious and Selden over the 
international legal regime of the seas, see WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
257–79 (2000).
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this Article steps outside the limits of classical international maritime law 
discourse to engage a completely different analysis, one which considers 
the EEZ surveillance issue as a microcosm through which to examine 
broader meta-questions about the regulation of intelligence, and of new 
surveillance technology.  Some of the policy recommendations provided
would seem to be of relevance to other intelligence-gathering fields, which 
I hope to further pursue in future works. In this regard, this Article is the 
first endeavor at a broader extrapolation of the International Law of 
Intelligence.

